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Abstract
This case study investigated operations of cooper­
ative federations in marketing milk in the Chicago 
regional federal order market in the early and 
mid-1970s. The Associated M ilk Producers Incor­
porated (AMPI) Agency qualified supply plants of 
participating firms, provided supplemental milk to 
processors, and marketed their surplus milk. Central 
Milk Producers Cooperative (CMPC) negotiated a su­
perpool price for class I milk, advance priced some 
class II and III milk, levied handling charges, and 
implemented a variety of marketing programs. Eco­
nomic consequences of these activities are evaluated.

Cooperative Activities in Marketing Fluid Milk 
in the Chicago Fédéral Order Market1
by Ronald E. Deiter, Sheldon W. Williams, and James W. Gruebele2
Producer cooperatives play a major role in mar­
keting fluid-grade milk in most large markets in the 
United States. Market services that they provide go 
far beyond representing producers in price negotia­
tions and in federal order hearings. They may include 
directing assembly and delivery of the milk, quality 
control, tailoring supplies to processors’ needs and 
disposing of surplus milk, adapting products and de­
liveries to processors’ specifications, and market de­
velopment.
This study is concerned with the activities of coop­
eratives, particularly federations, in marketing milk 
in the Chicago federal order market, one o f the 
largest in the country. Major objectives of the study 
are to describe and to make an economic evaluation of 
those activities and their effects on the market and on 
the welfare of producers. This study is different from 
most previous studies in that it analyzes services 
provided collectively rather than individually by co­
operative organizations.
Description of the Market
Area and population
The market in this case study is the Chicago re­
gional federal milk marketing order as defined since 
Jan. 1, 1969. The marketing area in the order in­
cludes the Chicago metropolitan area, the northern 
tiers of counties in central and western Illinois, and 
most of eastern and southern Wisconsin (fig. 1).
The population of the marketing area was not 
quite 11.4 million people in 1970. It was estimated to 
be nearly 11.6 million in 1979 [2, 1978, p. 12].
Milk deliveries
Producer deliveries under the order increased 
from 7.1 billion pounds in 1969 to 10.2 billion pounds
Support of this project in its initial stages by the University of 
Illinois is acknowledged. The authors are also deeply indebted to 
representatives of the dairy industry from the Chicago market 
whose participation made this study possible. Constructive sug­
gestions on an earlier draft were made by George W. Ladd and 
Roger G. Ginder. The authors, however, claim sole responsibility 
for the findings, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations of 
this report.
2Ronald E. Deiter is assistant professor, Department of Economics, 
Iowa State University. Sheldon W. Williams is professor, Depart­
ment of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign. James W. Gruebele is vice president and corporate 
economist, Dairyman’s Cooperative Creamery Association, Tulare, 
California.
in 1978 [2]. The percentage increase in deliveries 
exceeded that under all other federal orders, with the 
result that the Chicago order’s receipts constitute 
13 percent of the total for all orders in 1978 as com­
pared with not quite 12 percent in 1969. In 1976,
Fig. 1. Area regulated by the Chicago regional federal milk 
marketing order, 1976 [1, p. 15405].
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receipts from producers in the Chicago federal order 
market became larger than those in any other federal 
order market.
Average daily delivery per producer has not ex­
panded as much as the average for all federal order 
markets. Although it approximated the all-order av­
erage in 1969 and 1970, it was only 93 percent as 
much by 1978. This difference reflected a slight in­
crease in the number of producers delivering milk to 
Chicago order handlers during this period, while the 
number of producers in all federal order markets de­
clined by 17 percent.
Producers in Wisconsin were the source of 90 per­
cent of all producer deliveries in 1969 and more than 
92 percent since 1975 (table 1). Practically all the 
increase in producer receipts in the market between 
1969 and 1978, approximately 3.1 billion pounds, was 
from Wisconsin producers. A substantial part of the 
increased deliveries by Wisconsin producers resulted 
from conversion from the production of manufactur­
ing grade milk to the production of milk meeting 
health department standards for fluid use.
In addition, large quantities of Wisconsin milk 
are potentially available in the Chicago order mar­
ket. In fact, about 25 percent of Wisconsin’s fluid- 
grade milk is sold to other markets . Of possibly more 
importance is the large volume of manufacturing 
grade milk still being marketed in Wisconsin. Al­
though declining in the early 1970s as producers 
converted to the production of fluid-grade milk, the 
quantity of manufacturing-grade milk sold in Wis­
consin leveled out in the mid-1970s and in 1976 was 
76 percent of the quantity of Wisconsin milk deliv­
ered to plants regulated by the Chicago federal order.
Table 1. Actual and potential supplies of milk from 
Wisconsin, Chicago federal order market, 1969-76.
Table 2. Amount and proportion of producer deliveries used in 
class I products, Chicago federal order market, and proportion 
used in class I, all federal order markets, 1969-78.
Year
Producer deliveries used in class I products: 
Chicaao federal order market All markets
Quantity, mil. lb. Percent Percent
1969 3,609 51 64.3
1970 3,455 45 61.5
1971 3,442 43 59.3
1972 3,406 41 59.6
1973 3,341 42 61.2
1974 3,191 39 58.0
1975 3,201 36 57.9
1976 3,115 32 54.9
1977 3,053 30 52.8
1978 3,017 30 52.7
Source: [2]
nual quantity of milk used in those products declined 
by approximately 600 million pounds, or 16 percent. 
Because receipts were increasing during that period, 
the proportion used in class I products dropped 
sharply from 51 percent in 1969 to 30 percent in 1978. 
This drop was considerably greater than the average 
for all federal order markets, which, during the same 
period, declined from 64.3 percent to 52.7 percent.
The milk not used in fluid products is manufac­
tured into a variety of dairy products (table 3). The 
most important of these uses is cheese, which has 
absorbed an increasing proportion of the total. A 
large part of the surplus milk moves directly from the 
farms, where it is produced, to manufacturing plants 
in Wisconsin, where it is processed. Nevertheless, the 
presence in the market of large quantities of surplus 
milk, together with the need for cooperatives to di­
rect, manufacture, and market it, affects the market- 
level services provided by cooperative organizations 
and the bargaining environment.
Receipts from
Wisconsin producers, Other Wisconsin
Chicago federal Wisconsin manufac-
order fluid turing
Quantity, Percent of grade milk grade milk
Year mil. lb. total mil. lb. mil. lb.
1969 6,410 90.0 2,503 8,544
1970 6,922 91.0 2,745 8,189
1971 7,297 90.9 2,954 8,054
1972 7,565 91.2 3,329 7,770
1973 7,265 91.3 3,272 7,351
1974 7,463 91.6 3,570 7,133
1975 ' 8,167 92.2 3,485 6,703
1976 9,022 92.3 3,851 6,882
Sources: [3, 4]
Utilization
Table 3. Quantities of milk, skim milk, and cream used by pool 
handlers to produce selected dairy products, Chicago federal 
order market, 1970-78.®
Quantity of milk, skim milk, and cream used in
Year Cheese Butter
1970 1,747 146
1971 2,046 163
1972 2,324 170
1973 2,403 149
1974 3,093 125
1975 3,902 99
1976 4,527 138
1977 4,733 159
1978° 5,362 145
Nonfat 
dry milk
Other
products'9 Total
million pounds 
674 1,634 4,201
756 1,799 4,764
801 1,782 5,077
655 1,665 4,872
431 1,581 5,230
446 1,476 5,923
904 1,399 6,968
792 1,734 7,418
653 1,654 7,814
Both the quantity and the proportion of producer 
deliveries in the Chicago regional federal order mar­
ket used in class I products (fluid milk and cream) 
decreased between 1969 and 1978 (table 2). The an­
Source: [2]
»Data not available for 1969.
bCondensed and evaporated milk, whole milk powder, frozen desserts, cottage 
cheese, and miscellaneous other products.
»Preliminary.
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Implications
The extremely large proportion of excess milk on 
the Chicago regional federal order market has impor­
tant implications for the bargaining activities of co­
operatives in that market and for the dairy industry 
in general. While the proportion of class I utilization 
has been declining in many federal order markets, 
the decline has been much sharper in Chicago than 
on the average for all markets (table 2). By 1978, the 
proportion of class I utilization in Chicago was only 
57 percent as large as the average for all federal order 
markets and was below that on all others except the 
Upper Midwest order.
An important factor in the increase in producer 
receipts, which has been the major cause of the de­
cline in class I utilization, was that the differential 
between the class I price and the price paid for milk 
used in manufactured dairy products exceeded the 
differential required to obtain needed supplies of 
fluid milk [5, pp. 214-222]. This same factor presum­
ably also contributed to the decline in sales of fluid 
milk products during that period, which, on a per- 
capita basis, evidently exceeded the rate of decline in 
the national average [6]. Above-order premiums, 
which exceeded costs of providing market-level ser­
vices, also were obtained in the Chicago market dur­
ing this period and may have accentuated the effects 
of the higher than necessary class I differential [5, pp. 
216-218].
Bargaining activities of cooperatives in the Chi­
cago market must be carried out in the light of these 
adverse effects on the percentage of class I utilization 
brought about, in part, because of high prices to deal­
ers for milk used in fluid products. This is especially 
important because of the large quantity of manufac­
turing-grade milk still being produced in Wisconsin. 
Much of that milk is potentially available for the 
Chicago market if  the difference between the class I 
price, including premiums, and the price for man­
ufacturing-grade milk continues at or above recent 
levels.
As one example of the dimensions of the problem, 
Graf and Jacobson estimated that an additional 1.05 
billion pounds of milk pooled on the Chicago market 
in 1970 would have reduced the blend price by 7 cents 
per hundredweight [7, pp. 7-9]. To have maintained 
the blend price with this increase in receipts, cooper­
atives would have had to obtain from handlers an 
additional 17 cents per hundredweight for class I 
milk, without any reduction in class I sales, while 
holding class II prices constant. Indeed, a higher 
price for milk going into fluid use would be expected 
further to stimulate receipts from producers and to 
depress sales of fluid milk products, placing coopera­
tives in a very difficult position. To bargain intel­
ligently, cooperative management needs clearly to 
understand the price limitations facing them and to 
take into account other factors, such as pooling re­
quirements, that also may affect the conversion of 
manufacturing-grade milk to fluid grade.
Cooperative marketing and bargaining activities
in the Chicago market are further complicated by 
differences in goals among cooperative suppliers. 
Bargaining cooperatives (those processing less than 
10 percent of total receipts) and, in some measure, 
combination cooperatives (those processing between 
10 and 90 percent of total receipts) are primarily 
concerned with the market for fluid milk. Bargaining 
cooperatives, in particular, consider their members’ 
interests best served by disposing of as large a share 
of their milk as possible to fluid milk processors.
On the other hand, many operating cooperatives 
(those processing more than 90 percent of total re­
ceipts) in the Chicago milk supply area wish to par­
ticipate in the fluid milk market while using as much 
of their milk as possible to manufacture dairy prod­
ucts. To be price competitive, these plants'want pool 
status. This provides them with equalization pay­
ments from the producer settlement fund, which en­
ables them to pay producers a price above the pre­
vailing price for manufacturing-grade milk. At the 
same time, it is in their interest to minimize the 
quantity of milk that they ship to fluid milk plants. 
The reason for this is that their average processing 
cost per hundredweight is lowest when their plants 
are operating at or near capacity; unit costs increase 
and profits from their manufacturing operations de­
cline when milk is shipped to fluid milk processors. 
Having this dual set of objectives, operating coopera­
tives want the overhead federation that coordinates 
cooperative supply programs to assure them of pool 
plant qualification while minimizing the amount of 
milk that they ship to fluid milk plants.
Moreover, the distribution of population and of 
milk production within the Chicago federal order 
marketing area results in logistic problems with 
which the federation o f cooperatives must cope. 
Nearly two-thirds of the population of the marketing 
area is in Illinois, mainly in the Chicago metro­
politan area, and most of the Wisconsin consumers 
are in the southeastern part of the state. On the other 
hand, with the increase in pool receipts, the supply 
area has been expanding farther and farther into 
Wisconsin. For fluid milk processors this increase in 
average distance is reducing the proportion of re­
ceipts shipped directly from producers’ farms and 
increasing the proportion received from supply plants.
If it were not for pool plant requirements, with large 
excess supplies, pooled milk in the outer zones of the 
milkshed logically would be manufactured, and that in 
the inner zones delivered to fluid milk processors. Pool 
plant requirements necessitate some departure from 
that economizing principle. Nevertheless, within the 
limitations of federal order regulations and its control of 
the movement of the milk, the cooperative federation 
would be expected to supply fluid milk plants from the 
nearest sources to the fullest extent feasible.
Coordinating the supplying of milk to fluid milk 
processors has been made more complex by the pro­
nounced within-week fluctuations in processing that 
characterize the sale of a large share of the milk 
through food stores and 5-day-per-week processing 
plant operations. Cooperatives presumably can en-
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hance their bargaining power with processors by assist­
ing in timing the delivery of their milk supplies to meet 
these daily variations in their needs.
Cooperatives serving the Chicago regional federal 
milk marketing order operate in a market that now 
receives approximately one-twelfth of all milk produced 
in the United States. Because of the magnitude of the 
market, actions taken there may affect milk producers, 
dealers, and consumers, not only in that market, but 
also in other parts of the country.
Cooperatives in the Chicago Order 
Marketing Area
Importance
Cooperatives have dominated the marketing of 
milk in the Chicago regional federal order market 
since the order became effective in 1968. During the 
years 1971 through 1975, some 97 or 98 percent of the 
producers were cooperative members and also 97 to 
98 percent of the milk receipts were from cooperative 
members, with those proportions increasing very 
gradually over time (table 4). In December 1975, 
slightly more than one-fifth of the milk from coopera­
tive producers was from members of bargaining coop­
eratives that had no handling facilities. About half 
the rest was from members of operating cooperatives 
that received, in their own facilities, all the milk from 
their producers, and half was from producers of com­
bination-type cooperatives that had facilities that re­
ceived part, but not all, of their members’ milk. Be­
tween 1969 and 1975, the proportion of the coopera­
tive milk received by bargaining associations in­
creased while the proportion received by combina­
tion-type cooperatives decreased.
In August 1979, cooperatives operated 9 percent of 
the fluid milk processing plants and 41 percent of the 
supply plants regulated by the order. In November 
1975, 47 percent of the milk from producers was re­
ceived by cooperative plants while slightly more than 
half of the milk from members of cooperatives was 
delivered to plants operated by proprietary firms (fig. 2). 
An estimated 38 percent of the receipts at cooperative
plants was delivered to fluid milk processing plants, 
largely of proprietary handlers. In this way, supply- 
plant shipments from cooperatives to noncooperative 
fluid milk processing plants provided somewhat more 
than one-third of the milk delivered to those plants. A 
little more than half of the other milk delivered to those 
plants was shipments from noncooperative supply 
plants, and a little less than half was direct shipments 
from producers. It is possible that a comparatively large 
proportion of the noncooperative milk may have moved 
directly to proprietary handlers’ plants. Nevertheless, 
with 98 percent of the market’s receipts from coopera­
tive producers, one may conclude that the avenues by 
which cooperative producer milk reached fluid milk 
handlers were of the approximate relative importance 
indicated by these data.
Federations
The services involved in marketing cooperatives’ 
milk in the Chicago federal order market are largely 
performed by federations. The largest of these is the 
Central Milk Producers’ Cooperative (CMPC). This is 
the head organization; all cooperatives in the market 
that belong to any federation are members of CMPC. 
In August 1975,15 of the 30 cooperatives whose mem­
bers delivered milk to plants regulated under the 
order belonged to CMPC. These 15 included all the 
larger cooperatives; their members marketed 95 per­
cent of Chicago order receipts during that month. The 
CMPC members included 5 bargaining and 10 oper­
ating or combination-type cooperatives. In serving 
them, CMPC has been described as "a joint effort by 
dairymen working through their cooperatives to 
achieve marketing efficiencies, carry on marketing 
and dairy products promotion programs, and in­
crease returns to milk producers”[9].
CMPC activities include (1) determining advance 
pricing policies, (2) establishing handling or service 
charges, and (3) implementing various marketing 
programs or services. These activities are intended to 
improve the terms of trade for CMPC-affiliated dairy 
farmers.
CMPC announces prices to be paid by processors
Table 4. Cooperative producers and milk deliveries on the Chicago regional federal milk marketing order, December, 196
Cooperative milk producers Deliveries by members of cooperatives
Quantity, Percent bv type of cooperative8
Percent million Percent Bargaining13 Combination0 Operating*1
Year Number of total pounds of total
1969 16,057 97.5 579.6 97.4 data not available
1970 16,160 95.3 599.1 94.9 7.9 52.5 39.6
1971 16,227 97.4 620.4 97.3 13.1 50.9 36.0
1972 16,417 97.2 624.8 97.3 12.1 50.4 37.4
1973 16,847 97.9 612.0 98.2 16.9 45.0 38.2
1974 16,676 98.1 662.6 98.3 19.0 43.1 37.9
1975 17,380 98.0 734.0 98.1 20.7 40.1 39.2
Source: [8]
aMay not total exactly to 100 because of rounding. 
bCooperatives that did not receive any of their members’ milk. 
Cooperatives that received part, but not all, of their members’ milk. 
Cooperatives that received all of their members’ milk.
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a Estimated by assuming that distributing plants used 90 percent of deliveries to them in Class I. 
b Estimated by subtracting direct shipments to cooperative plants from the total quantity of milk 
delivered to cooperative distributing plants.
c Estimated by subtracting direct shipments to cooperative plants and supply plant shipments to 
cooperative plants from total cooperative receipts delivered to distributing plants, 
d Estimated by subtracting direct shipments to noncooperative plants and cooperative supply plant ship­
ments to noncooperative plants from the total quantity of milk delivered to noncooperative 
distributing plants.
e Estimated by assuming that the ratio of cooperative (noncooperative) distributing plant deliveries to
all distributing plant deliveries was the same as the ratio of the number of cooperative (noncooperative) 
distributing plants to the number of all distributing plants.
Fig. 2. Disposition of regulated milk receipts at cooperative and noncooperative plants by class, and estimated deliveries to 
distributing plants by type of shipment, Chicago regional federal milk marketing order, Novermber 1975 (data are in million 
pounds). Source: [181.
for milk and for the services they purchase from 
organizations for which CMPC is the authorized bar­
gaining agent. CMPC also determines how the funds 
obtained from processors for milk and for services are 
to be divided among producers and among the agen­
cies providing the various services or marketing pro­
grams.
A second major organization of cooperatives in the 
market is the Central Milk Sales Agency (CMSA). 
CMSA is an unincorporated association of seven oper­
ating and combination-type cooperatives, including 
the largest ones in the market. The service arm of 
CMSA is Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated 
(AMPI), a large regional cooperative and the largest 
in the Chicago regional order. In performing CMSA 
functions, AMPI is referred to as the AMPI Agency.
In addition to CMSA, the AMPI Agency markets 
milk for 15 proprietary firms that receive milk from 
AMPI producers. All CMSA cooperatives are mem­
bers of CMPC. All milk and services sold by AMPI 
Agency plants are marketed at prices and service 
charges established by CMPC. In 1975, AM PI 
Agency plants marketed 49 percent of all milk mar­
keted by CMPC (fig. 3).
The AMPI Agency performs three general func­
tions: (1) qualifying affiliated supply plants, (2) pro­
viding supplemental milk to fluid handlers, and (3) dis­
posing of surplus milk in the market (see next section).
The latter two functions are part of the process of coordi­
nating the supply of milk for fluid use with demand in 
the Chicago order market. Both the CMSA cooperatives 
and the proprietary firms that market their milk 
through the AMPI Agency have, as a common goal, 
getting their manufacturing supply plants pooled on 
the Chicago order market. In return, they agree to 
maintain sufficient manufacturing facilities to process, 
at any time of the year, all their milk that is marketed 
by the AMPI Agency.
There seem to be at least two reasons that the pro­
prietary firms affiliated with the AMPI Agency are not 
members of CMSA. For one, under provisions of the 
order, supply plants of two or more firms may be pooled 
as a unit only if they are plants of cooperatives. In 
addition, joint ventures among marketing cooperatives, 
such as federations, have the legal sanction of the Cap­
per-Volstead Act only if those organizations are cooper­
atives [11]. The activities of the AMPI Agency evidently 
are considered to be a supply arrangement rather than 
a joint venture.
CMSA is a federation within CMPC. CMSA is com­
posed of operating cooperatives that are especially con­
cerned with having their plants pooled under the order 
in an equitable manner. The AMPI Agency accom­
plishes this by performing functions involving the 
physical movement of milk, including providing supple­
mentary supplies to processors when needed and dis.-
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posing of surplus milk as it becomes necessary to do so. 
In contrast to these physical functions performed by the 
AMPI Agency, the main activities of CMPC are bar­
gaining and financial in character.
A third organization is the Lakeshore Federated 
Dairy Cooperative, which operates outside the Chicago 
metropolitan area. It is a federation of three bargaining 
cooperatives with no processing facilities and is de­
signed to facilitate pool qualification by its members. 
These bargaining associations assemble and direct the 
sale of their producers’ milk through reload stations to 
handlers in Rockford, Milwaukee, Manitowoc, and 
Sheboygan.
The Association of Operating Cooperatives (AOC) is 
a discussion group of six Wisconsin operating coopera­
tives, which meet to consider marketing developments 
of mutual interest. AOC members do not act or express 
themselves as a group, although the organization might 
serve to reduce the risk to its members of getting pooled 
under the order if something were to happen to the 
AMPI Agency.
A fifth federation is Chicagoland Dairy Sales, Inc. 
(CDSI). It was formed by four Wisconsin operating coop­
eratives to enable them to qualify for the pool with
minimum shipments of class I milk to handlers. CDSI 
cooperatives are members of CMPC, CMSA, and AOC. 
CDSI lessens the risk to its members of not getting 
qualified on the Chicago order.
All these cooperative organizations can be viewed as 
bargaining tools used by dairy farmers to negotiate 
collectively with fluid milk buyers. The organization of 
federations increases seller concentration and enables 
member cooperatives to work together to enhance re­
turns to producers rather than to operate as competing 
sellers.
Activities of the AM Pi Agency
The three major functions of the AMPI Agency 
are (1) qualifying affiliated supply plants, (2) provid­
ing supplementary milk supplies to fluid milk hand­
lers, and (3) disposing of surplus milk in the market. 
They will be considered in that order.
Qualifying supply plants
In the Chicago federal order market, supply 
plants seek to become pooled because the benefits of
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sharing in returns from class I sales through the 
producer settlement fund usually outweigh the costs 
of qualifying for the pool. The performance standards 
these plants must meet are designed to ensure that 
they are legitimately involved in serving the fluid 
milk needs of the market. Those provisions are 
intended to be sufficiently stringent to ensure that 
plants meeting them will share in the responsibility 
for providing enough milk to meet the needs of the 
market. One indication of this is that pooled supply 
plants are required to ship a larger percentage of 
their receipts to distributing plants during the sea­
son of low milk production than during the rest of the 
year.
Qualification Requirements.3 Distributing plants 
are regulated if they market specified minimum pro­
portions of their grade A receipts in fluid milk prod­
ucts in the marketing area.
During 1975-76, a distributing plant in the Chi­
cago regional order market was regulated if not less 
than 45 percent of its grade A receipts in September- 
December, 35 percent in January-March and in Au­
gust, and 30 percent in all other months were used in 
fluid milk products. In addition, to be regulated by 
the Chicago regional order, at least 10 percent of the 
plant’s output of fluid milk products must have been 
distributed on sales routes within the area regulated 
by the order.
During 1975-76, the qualification requirements 
for regulated supply plants on the Chicago regional 
order specified that those plants had to ship to regu­
lated distributing plants at least 30 percent of their 
grade A receipts in September, 35 percent in October 
and November, 25 percent in December, and 20 per­
cent in all other months. Supply plants in the market 
were automatically qualified during the period April- 
July if they met qualification provisions for the pre­
ceding August-March. Under certain circumstances, 
the Director of the Dairy Division, USDA, is autho­
rized to adjust requirements stated in the order up or 
down by up to 10 percentage points, depending on 
supply and demand conditions in the market.
Qualification provisions for the Chicago order en­
able certain supply plants to qualify as a unit. Under
this arrangement, a particular supply plant may be 
qualified by shipping approximately half the milk 
otherwise required, provided the supply plants in the 
unit, as a group, meet the shipping requirements 
specified in the preceding paragraph. Supply plants 
of one or more cooperatives may be included in a unit, 
but supply plants of proprietary handlers may be 
included to make a unit only if  all the plants included 
are owned by one handler.
The unit-qualification rule increases the bargain­
ing power of dairy cooperatives because it encourages 
them to market their milk collectively rather than to 
compete on an individual basis. This not only pro­
motes organizational unity among cooperatives but 
also, by increasing seller concentration, gives fluid 
milk processors fewer choices as to where they may 
buy milk. On this market, the unit-qualification rule 
also encourages proprietary supply plants to market 
their milk through the AMPI Agency, which guaran­
tees them pool status. This results because the unit 
rule may enable cooperatives to become pooled at 
lower cost than proprietary firms, thus making it 
more difficult for proprietary firms to compete with 
cooperatives for pool status.
Meeting performance standards requires more 
than willingness to ship the specified proportion of 
the plant’s milk. It also requires finding one or more 
buyers for the milk. The AMPI Agency meets the 
latter requirement, guaranteeing its supply plants 
pool status. In contracting to do this, the AMPI 
Agency has authority, if  needed, to take all milk 
received by its supply plants (except for milk commit­
ted by those supply plants to processors not serviced 
by the Agency) to meet the needs of fluid milk deal­
ers. This arrangement provides the Agency with the 
flexibility needed to operate effectively.
AMPI Agency Operations.4 Between 1969 and 
1975, the number of supply plants pooled on the Chi­
cago order by the AMPI Agency increased 90 percent, 
and the quantity of milk increased 39 percent (table 5). 
The largest relative increases were in numbers of plants 
and receipts of AMPI itself, although numbers and 
receipts of proprietary supply plants marketing milk 
through the Agency also increased sharply.
^his information is from [1,8]. '‘This information was obtained primarily from [10].
Table 5. Regulated plants and producer milk receipts of the AMPI Agency, Chicago regional federal milk marketing order, 
1969-75.
AMPI Agency plants8 (No.) AMPI Agency milk (mil. ib.)
Year AMPI
Other
co-ops
Proprietary 
handlers Total AMPI
Other
co-ops
Proprietary 
handlers1 Total
1969 6 17 10 33 398 2,232 470 3,100
1970 7 17 9 33 421 2,583 533 3,537
1971 14 17 12 43 585 1,910 662 3,157
1972 17 19 9 45 739 1,984 864 3,587
1973 13 20 14 47 763 2,261 728 3,752
1974 13 20 14 47 750 2,306 643 3,699
1975 20 22 21 63 893 2,538 886 4,316
Sources: [8, 10] 
aDuring August
includes milk from members of cooperatives shipping to those plants.
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In August 1975, the AMPI Agency plants were 47 
percent of the supply plants pooled on the Chicago order 
and received 49 percent of all milk regulated by the 
order. AMPI’s own plants received approximately one- 
fifth of the AMPI Agency milk, while other cooperatives 
and proprietary plants received approximately three- 
fifths and one-fifth, respectively. Because the number of 
plants in each of the three categories was about the 
same, average volume of plants of the other cooperatives 
was more than two and one-half times that of either the 
AMPI plants or the proprietary plants.
During October 1975, AMPI Agency supply plants 
shipped 42 percent of their regulated receipts to fluid 
milk processors, a proportion exceeding the 35 percent 
required by the order (table 6). The percentages were 43 
for plants of cooperatives and 37 percent for plants of 
proprietary handlers. To encourage continuing affilia­
tion, the Agency attempts to equalize the shipping per­
centages of the various plants it services.
For several reasons differences among plants in the 
percentage of regulated receipts shipped to fluid milk 
processors remain. One factor is the differences in in­
spection restrictions. Because AMPI Agency sales are 
concentrated in the Chicago metropolitan area, which 
requires Chicago-inspected milk, supply plants with 
that inspection may have to ship larger percentages of 
their milk than plants with state inspection. Likewise, 
receiving stations, which have no processing facilities 
and little storage, may be asked to ship a larger propor­
tion of their milk than manufacturing plants. In Octo­
ber 1975, for example, receiving stations received 27 
percent of the Agency’s regulated milk, but provided 40 
percent of that shipped to fluid processors, while ap­
proximately the reverse was true of cheese plants. The 
shipping percentage may be somewhat lower from more 
distant points.
Usually the AMPI Agency will call for some milk 
from a supply plant on about five of every six or seven 
days if the plant needs to ship 15 percent of its receipts 
to qualify. If the plant was not shipping under the unit
rule, its required shipping percentage would be approx­
imately twice as large, and milk would be called for in 
larger quantity and perhaps more frequently. When 
sales are light at the beginning of the month, the 
Agency keeps a close record of the supply plant’s re­
ceipts to be certain that it ships enough milk that 
month to qualify.
The AMPI Agency has enabled member plants that 
qualified dining the other months to benefit from the 
lack of a shipping requirement during the months of 
April through July. In May 1975, 30 of the 63 Agency 
plants shipped 15 percent or less of their regulated 
receipts to fluid milk processors, with 11 manufacturing 
plants and 1 other plant making no shipments.
Economic Effects o f Plant Qualification Activities. 
Aside from the bargaining impacts already dis­
cussed, there are several economic consequences of 
AMPI Agency operations. For one, member plants 
generally benefit from being pooled on the order. 
They benefit because suppliers with class I utilization 
below the market average, such as most manufactur­
ing plants, receive payments from the producer set­
tlement fund equal to the difference between their 
obligation to the pool and the value of their regulated 
receipts at the m arket’s blend price. A  regulated 
plant’s obligation to the pool is the product of its class 
I, II, and III sales times the respective class I, II, and 
III prices.
Supply plants in manufacturing milk areas that 
receive payments from the producer settlement fund 
gain a pay-price advantage over nonpooled plants. 
The amount of this advantage is the excess of the 
blend price in that area over the prevailing competi­
tive market price, namely the grade B price. In 1976, 
Chicago order blend prices in the various crop report­
ing districts of Wisconsin exceeded the grade B price 
by amounts ranging from 36 to 57 cents per hundred­
weight (table 7). These amounts represented the pre­
miums pooled plants could pay above the prices paid 
by nonpooled plants if  all money received from the
Table 6. Numbers, and size and relative importance in terms of receipts, and shipments to fluid milk processors of various 
types of AMPI Agency plants, October 1975.
Proportion Proportion of
Average daily (1000 pounds) of AMPl Agency
Character of plant Number
Receipts 
per plant
Shipments 
per plant
receipts
shipped
Milk
receipts
Milk
shipments
Inspection
Chicago 30 279 119 43 73 75
State 32 95 37 39 27 25
Type
Cheese 39 117 34 29 40 28
Receiving
station 14 219 137 62 27 40
Butter/powder 
or powder 9 421 169 40 33 32
Operatorship
Noncooperative 20 109 41 37 19 17
Cooperative 42 220 94 43 81 83
All AMPI Agency 62a 184 77 42 100 100
Source: [10]
O ne  of the 63 AMPI Agency plants regulated during August 1975 was depooled during October.
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Table 7. Average grade B and federal order blend prices by Wisconsin crop reporting districts, 1976.a
Crop reporting 
district
Grade B 
price
Blend
price
North central 8.63 9.01
Northeast 8.60 9.09
West central 8.51 8.97
Central 8.54 9.07
East central 8.71 9.07
Southwest 8.55 9.12
South central 8.72 9.12
Southeast 8.64 9.16
Source: [12]
“All prices are adjusted to milk of 3.5 percent fat.
bThe average MW (Minnesota-Wisconsin) price for 3.5 milk in 1976 was $8.48
producer settlement fund was paid out to producers.
During 1976, and quite possibly in other periods, 
many Wisconsin cheese manufacturing plants that 
achieved pool status also benefited by obtaining the 
milk they used in manufacturing at a price below the 
competitive pay price in that locality. Under the 
order, the class III price that these plants pay for milk 
used in manufacturing is the Minnesota-Wisconsin 
(MW) price, which is the average reported price paid 
for milk by approximately 100 manufacturing plants 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The average MW price 
in 1976, adjusted to a 3.5 test, was $8.48 per hundred­
weight. The cost to nonpooled plants for milk for 
manufacturing is the competitive market price, or 
grade B price. In 1976, in all crop reporting districts 
in Wisconsin, the average grade B price exceeded the 
MW price. The excess ranged from a low of 3 cents per 
hundredweight in the west central district to a high 
of 24 cents per hundredweight in the south central 
district.5
The monetary benefit that pooled manufacturing 
plants received over nonpooled plants was the sum of 
their pay-price advantage plus the cost advantage 
they had on milk used in manufacturing. This total 
equaled the payment the plant received from the 
producer settlement fund. In 1976, in the various crop 
reporting districts of Wisconsin, this amount ranged 
from 49 cents to 68 cents per hundredweight of class 
HI milk. Because this benefit was on milk used in 
manufacturing, the individual plant’s incentive to 
become pooled varied inversely with its percentage of 
class I utilization as well as with the difference be­
tween the blend and grade B price in that area.
A plant incurs some costs to receive the benefits of 
being pooled on a federal order. They may include (1) in­
creased manufacturing costs that result from operating 
at a lower level of capacity when shipping milk to fluid 
processors; (2) extra handling costs, as when separate
'The MW price is an average price paid by Minnesota and Wiscon­
sin plants for milk used in manufacture of cheese or butter and 
nonfat dry milk. In recent years, cheese plants quite commonly 
nave been able to pay higher prices for milk than butter-powder 
Plants. Consequently, in Wisconsin, where cheese plants are domi­
nant, it has been possible for the grade B price to exceed the MW 
price.
Price differences
Grade B Blend less Blend
less MWb_____ grade B less MW
dollars per hundredweight of milk
0.15 0.38 0.53
0.12 0.49 0.61
0.03 0.46 0.49
0.06 0.53 0.59
0.13 0.36 0.49
0.07 0.57 0.64
0.24 0.40 0.64
0.16 0.52 0.68
1976, p. 75],
grade A and grade B receiving facilties are used; (3) 
added health inspection costs; (4) market administra­
tor’s fees; and (5) shrinkage.
Related to pooling is the comparative cost of produc­
ing grade A and grade B milk, and so of the price 
premium needed to convert producers from grade B to 
grade A. Recent research indicates that the added cost 
of producing grade A milk is small, probably not exceed­
ing 25 to 30 cents per hundredweight [13,14].
Whatever these costs were, the considerable in­
crease in receipts from supply plants on the Chicago 
federal milk marketing order since 1969 suggests that 
the benefits of participating in the pool substantially 
exceeded the costs. Between December 1969 and 
November 1975, supply plant receipts in the order in­
creased 32 percent while total receipts increased 14 
percent; as a result, supply plant receipts increased 
from 70 to 85 percent of the total receipts. The conver­
sion from grade B to grade A milk production, which 
probably accompanied this increase in receipts from 
supply plants, reduced supplies of grade B milk avail­
able to manufacturing plants. The reduction in grade B 
milk supplies presumably puts pressure on unpooled 
manufacturing plants to become pooled in order to com­
pete more effectively for remaining supplies of milk.
Besides the pay-price advantage, a second economic 
benefit is that supply plants experience less risk and 
uncertainty in obtaining pooled status by belonging to 
the AMPI Agency. One reason for this is that the 
Agency, by selling milk to a number of handlers, 
spreads the risk associated with the loss of an account. 
Likewise, through specialization, the Agency may be 
better able than individual plants to monitor changes 
in receipts that affect qualification and to make any 
changes in shipments needed to keep member plants 
pooled. In addition, a centralized source offers advan­
tages to fluid milk processors in dependability of sup­
plies, in both timing and quantity of deliveries, and in 
the convenience of obtaining all needed milk from one 
source. Moreover, by reducing the number of sellers 
willing to supply milk to processors, joint action in­
creases the likelihood that the Agency’s plants will 
become pooled.
The reduction in risk and uncertainty benefits both
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suppliers and processors. It enables Agency supply 
plants to compete in manufacturing on the basis of the 
internal efficiency of their plant operations since each 
plant has approximately the same shipping percentage 
as other Agency manufacturing plants. It also promotes 
market stability. If individual supply plants were com­
peting for sales, there probably would be more disrup­
tions in relations among supply plants, and between 
supply plants and distributing plants, and so there 
would be higher marketing and procurement costs than 
with collective marketing.
The third economic consideration is the cost savings 
made possible by joint activity. Because the 42 CMSA 
cooperative plants serviced by the AMPI Agency may 
be qualified as a unit, significant savings in transporta­
tion and manufacturing costs are possible. Transporta­
tion cost savings result because the Agency frequently 
is able to direct the shipment of milk to a fluid handler 
from the nearest available supply. It is impossible to 
make a precise estimate of these savings. To show their 
importance, however, if the Agency reduces by 10 miles 
the average distance over which its members’ milk 
moves, transportation cost savings would be approx­
imately 2.0 cents per hundredweight. With Agency- 
directed sales to fluid milk processors of approximately 
1.1 billion pounds (fig. 2), this could result in an annual 
saving of approximately $220,000 to processors, who 
typically pay hauling costs. To the extent that it is 
realized, this saving, which conceivably could be passed 
on to consumers, provides "opponent-gain” bargaining 
power to members of the AMPI Agency because Agency 
activities produce benefits or gains for the firms with 
whom they are bargaining.
Manufacturing cost savings arise because the 
Agency’s manufacturing plants are able to minimize 
the quantities of milk they ship to fluid milk processors. 
In October 1975, Agency cheese plants shipped only 70 
percent as much of their receipts to fluid milk pro­
cessors as did all Agency plants (table 6). A recent 
USDA study indicates that manufacturing costs de­
crease by an average of 1.4 percent for each percentage 
point increase in the quantity of milk manufactured 
[15]. These cheese plants probably would have shipped 
smaller percentages of their receipts than other supply 
plants even if the cooperatives operating them had 
qualified only their own plants under the unit rule. If 
we assume, however, that the AMPI Agency reduced 
cheese plant shipments by an average of 5 percentage 
points, the USDA study suggests that manufacturing 
costs of those plants would have been reduced by ap­
proximately 7 percent. If average cheese manufacturing 
costs are 88 cents per hundredweight [16, 17], these 
savings would have amounted to 6.2 cents per hundred­
weight of milk manufactured.
Providing supplementary milk
A second major function of the AMPI Agency is to 
supply milk to fluid milk processors. In August 1975, 
19 of the 52 distributing plants regulated by the Chi­
cago regional order were in Illinois, 17 of them in the 
Chicago metropolitan area. The Chicago plants ac­
counted for approximately two-thirds of the order’s
class I sales [8; 2, p.38]. Except for some milk going to li 
cooperative d istr ib u tin g  p lants, all the AMPI 
Agency’s 1975 sales to plants regulated by the order ■  
were to 13 of these plants in the Chicago metropolitan 
area.
Although processors purchased various propor- I  
tions of their milk from the Agency, none purchased 
milk exclusively from the Agency nor had a full sup- I  
ply contract with it. During 1975, an estimated 50 per­
cent of the receipts of these 13 plants was obtained from a
the Agency. Class I sales of those plants were estimated 
to be 90 percent of the class I sales of all distributing I  
plants in the Chicago metropolitan area, and 60 percent 
of the order’s class I sales. ■
AMPI Agency Operations. Fluid milk processors 
buy milk from the AMPI Agency only as they need it I  
to supplement milk they receive from other sources. I 
The sources for a given processor may be direct-ship 
producers, the processor’s own supply plant, a supply 
plant operated by a firm not associated with the 
AMPI Agency, or a combination of sources.
The usual procedure is for processors to order 
milk each Friday for the following week. Scheduled 
deliveries may be adjusted, given 24 hours’ notice. 
Thus, the Agency commonly knows the quantities of 
milk to be delivered about 2 days in advance, al­
though milk may be delivered on much shorter 
notice.
The AMPI does not deliver milk. Rather it directs 
the processor where to obtain it. In doing this, the i 
Agency attempts to minimize transportation and to 
equalize the distances various processors must haul | 
Agency milk.
Between 1969 and 1975, Agency supply plants an- , 
nually marketed between 1.0 and 1.5 billion pounds of 
milk to fluid milk processors, with the quantity gradu­
ally increasing over time (table 8). This was between 35 
and 40 percent of regulated receipts of those supply 
plants. A varying proportion of those shipments, but in 
no instance appreciably more than one-third, was sold 
directly by the individual cooperatives belonging to the 
Agency rather than through the Agency.
Shipments by AMPI Agency plants constituted a 
growing proportion of the class I milk in the order, 
increasing from 28 percent in 1969 to 42 percent in 
1975. One of the reasons was a decrease in supplies from 
other sources, particularly a drop in direct-shipped re­
ceipts reflecting reduced milk production near Chicago 
[10]. This change strengthened the bargaining position 
of the AMPI Agency.
The quantities of milk marketed to fluid processors 
through the A gen cy  exh ib ited  w ide seasonal 
fluctuations. In the year ended April 30,1976, monthly 
sales ranged from a low of aproximately 2.0 million 
pounds in June to a high of 3.8 (nearly twice as much) in 
October. This seasonal pattern showed that the AMPI 
Agency, as a supplementary supplier, was called on for 
increased quantities of milk when processors received 
the smallest quantities from other sources, and vice 
versa. Its sharply reduced sales in the season of flush 
production indicated that Agency plants were manufac­
turing a disproportionately large share of the surplus 
milk in that season. In these ways, the Agency was
Table 8. Quantity of milk shipped by AMP! Agency plants to fluid milk processors, relationship to receipts, proportions by categories, 
and contributions to Chicago order class I sales, 1969-75.
Percent sold through Shipments to
AM PI Agency to__________  Chicago as per-
Year
Shipments, 
mil. lb.
Percent 
of total 
receipts
Percent
direct8
Chicago
processors
Processors 
in other 
markets
cent of Chicago 
order class 1 
sales15
1969 1178 38 31 65 5 28
1970 1267 36 33 64 3 32
1971 1086 34 14 83 3 28
1972 1301 36 30 69 1 34
1973 1491 40 22 77 1 40
1974 1478 40 31 66 3 40
1975 1521 35 34 64 2 42
Sources: [10,2]
aSold directly to Chicago order processors without being ordered through the Agency. 
bAssumes 90 percent of shipments to fluid milk processors was used in class I products.
providing important market services beyond those in­
volved in merely supplying milk.
Agency shipments to fluid milk processors also fluc­
tuated widely by day of the week. The bulk of the 
shipments was made during Monday-Thursday, with 23 
percent of the total on Thursday as against 3 percent on 
Saturday and 7 percent on Friday. This pattern re­
flected the fact that most fluid milk processing plants 
operated only 5 or fewer days per week. Processors’ 
schedules, in turn, were affected by the widely fluctuat­
ing sales of retail stores, with large volume over the 
weekend and relatively light sales during the middle of 
the week. Nevertheless, in day-of-the-week variation as 
well as seasonally, the AMPI Agency, as a supplemental 
supplier, was helping to adjust fluid milk supplies to 
market demands. With Agency supply plants doing 
this, fluid milk processors maximized the proportion of 
their receipts from other sources used in class I products 
and minimized the proportion that was surplus.
Economic Effects o f Supplementary Milk A c­
tivities. Advantages to AMPI Agency’s fluid milk 
buyers of obtaining supplementary supplies through 
the Agency included reduction of risk and uncer­
tainty in procurement. The Agency could be de­
pended upon to provide the quantities of milk order­
ed. Also, if severe weather or some other emergency 
reduced supplies from regular sources, the Agency 
would provide milk to meet the need.
A second advantage to the processor was that he 
obtained milk at a lower cost. Because the processor 
could adjust the quantity of milk purchased through 
the Agency to his needs, he could largely avoid the 
costs of marketing the surplus milk, which would 
otherwise burden him due to seasonal and weekly 
fluctuations in receipts and sales. During 1975, if 
receipts had just equaled class I sales in October, 
when they were largest, a processor with normal 
seasonal distribution of sales buying all his milk 
from producers whose deliveries exhibited normal 
seasonal variation would have had excess milk equiv­
alent in volume to 35 percent of his class I sales for 
the year. This estimate disregards any surplus that 
might have resulted from having receipts in excess of 
class I sales in October, or from day-of-the-week fluc­
tuations in class I use. With ensured supplies yet
little or no surplus, processors are in a better position 
to specialize in processing and distributing milk and 
thereby may improve their efficiency and competitive 
advantage in those operations.
A disadvantage to fluid milk processors is that, as 
they relinquish the procurement function, they be­
come dependent upon the Agency for milk supplies, 
thereby reducing their bargaining power. The more 
they depend upon the Agency, the more bargaining 
power they surrender.
Providing supplem entary m ilk  gives Agency 
members the advantages of ensured pool status and 
increased bargaining power previously described. 
But Agency plants incur extra costs to do this. For 
example, their shipments to processors are relatively 
large during the fall and early winter, leaving them 
with comparatively small quantities of milk for man­
ufacture. Also, the widely fluctuating day-of-the- 
week shipments to processors, and the fact that some 
shipments are made on short notice, tend to disrupt 
manufacturing operations. Particularly in plants 
with unionized workers, reductions and irregular­
ities in quantities of milk to be manufactured in­
crease unit labor costs by reducing efficiency in the 
use of labor in some periods while necessitating pay­
ment of overtime wages in others.
In addition to these effects upon individual sup­
pliers and processors, there are important market­
wide benefits in operational efficiency from a coor­
dinated provision of supplementary supplies. These 
benefits stem partly from the ability of the Agency to 
provide supplementary milk with a lower level of 
reserves than would be needed i f  fluid milk pro­
cessors individually procured their own. This is be­
cause individual fluid milk processors have different 
receipt and utilization patterns that are partly offset­
ting. For example, a comparison of the purchases of 
supplementary supplies by the 13 handlers during 
the period February 27 to March 20,1976, with the 
reserve production needed, assuming uniform daily 
production equal to the handler’s largest daily pur­
chases of supplementary supplies, indicated that, in 
the aggregate, excess reserves necessary under the 
latter assumption were 122 percent of purchases if 
each handler had provided his reserves individually
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and 92 percent of purchases if a centralized service 
had provided the reserve supply. This comparison 
indicates not only that the Agency saved fluid milk 
processors from receiving considerable excess milk 
but also that, by providing milk from a central 
source, the Agency reduced the amount of reserves 
needed by 14 percent [10].
The market also benefits because AMPI Agency 
plants can manufacture surplus milk at lower cost 
than fluid milk processors can. Because Agency sup­
ply plants have manufacturing facilities, we assume 
they process milk in large volume operations. We can 
estimate the cost of manufacturing the surplus dur­
ing the period February 22 to March 30,1976, when 
supplementary milk was supplied only as needed by 
AMPI Agency plants, comparing it with the cost un­
der various arrangements in which individual pro­
cessors are assumed to be responsible either for 
obtaining the reserve milk or for manufacturing the 
surplus, or for both (table 9).
The comparison of costs in table 9 differentiates 
two sources of savings made under the existing AMPI 
Agency arrangement during the period February 22 
to March 20,1976. A saving estimated at $197,176 if 
fluid milk processors individually obtained their own 
reserve supplies of milk, or $145,784 if  Agency plants 
provided processors with needed supplementary sup­
plies, results from the lower cost of manufacturing 
the surplus in Agency plants than in processors’ oper­
ations. The other saving, estimated to be $213,523 if 
processors manufactured the surplus, or $162,131 if 
Agency plants manufactured it, is attributable to the 
smaller quantity of excess milk when supplemental 
milk is provided by Agency plants rather than all 
needed reserves being obtained individually by pro­
cessors.
The existing arrangement, number 4, represen­
ted a saving of $359,307 in comparison with an ar­
rangement in which fluid milk processors indi­
vidually obtained the reserve milk needed to provide 
their supplemental supplies and manufactured their 
own surplus milk. If we assume this was a representa­
tive month, the corresponding annual cost savings 
would have been approximately $4.3 million. This 
would have been equivalent to 4.4 cents per hundred­
weight of Chicago order receipts in 1976, or 13.8 cents 
per hundredweight of class I sales. Although some 
other organization might have performed this func­
tion, it was a logical arrangement for a federation of 
cooperatives to do so.
Under the assumptions made in this analysis, it 
seems that, at most, 6 of the 13 fluid milk processors 
might have been able to break even in processing 
their surplus milk and that only 2 might have achiev­
ed manufacturing costs as low as Agency plants. This 
ability of the cooperatives to manufacture surplus 
m ilk more e fficiently  than individual handlers 
strengthens the cooperatives’ bargaining power.
Marketing processors’ surplus milk
A third major service of the AMPI Agency is mar­
keting processors’ surplus milk. Agency plants man­
ufacture any part of their own producer receipts not 
shipped to fluid milk processors. Such milk might be 
considered surplus in the sense that it is in excess of 
the needs of fluid milk markets. But it is milk they 
are able and w illing to manufacture. During the 
years 1969-1975, such milk represented 90 percent or 
more of the excess milk manufactured by Agency 
plants during the peak production months of April- 
July.
AMPI Agency Operations. Milk from direct-ship 
producers, or perhaps more commonly from supply 
plants of fluid milk processors, that is in excess of 
fluid handler needs is also surplus in the more tradi-
Table 9. Estimated cost under various arrangements to manufacture the surplus milk resulting from providing the reserve milk 
needed to furnish the 13 fluid milk processors serviced by AMPI Agency plants with needed supplementary milk, Feb. 22- 
March 20,1976.
Estimated cost of
j otai manufacturing surplus into cheese
surplus Average8
Arrangement milk, 1000 lb. per cwt. Total
1. Fluid milk processors individually obtain all 
needed reserve milk and manufacture their 
own surplus 74,495 $1.14 $852,732
2. Fluid milk processors individually obtain all 
needed reserve milk, but surplus is manufac­
tured by AMPI Agency plants 74,495 0.88 655,55fr
3. AMPI Agency plants provide quantity of re­
serve milk needed collectively by fluid milk pro­
cessors, who manufacture their own surplus 56,071 1.14 639,209
4. AMPI Agency plants obtain quantity of re­
serve milk needed to provide processors with 
supplemental supplies; surplus manufactured 
by Agency plants 56,071 0.88 493,425
Source: [10]
aln reality, these average costs might be slightly higher with the smaller quantities under arrangements 3 and 4.
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tional sense. Upon request, AMPI Agency sells such 
milk to manufacturing plants in the area. Without 
taking title, the Agency sells the milk by bid to the 
manufacturing plant, whether operated by a firm 
selling fluid-grade milk through the Agency or some 
other firm, which will return the highest net price for 
it, considering both bid price and transportation cost. 
Usually, this milk is not received at a distributing 
plant, but is routed directly from the supply plant 
where it is received, or else from producers, to the 
manufacturing plant.
Most of the nonAgency surplus milk is marketed 
during April-July, when milk production is highest 
and class I sales relatively low. During the years 
1969-1975, the quantity of such milk varied widely, 
ranging from a low of 16 million pounds in 1973 to a 
high of 108 million in 1974. In some years, it included 
considerable quantities from plants outside the Chi­
cago order market, mostly Indiana distributing 
plants, for which the AMPI Agency may have been 
obligated to market surplus because of fluid milk 
sales to them.
Reflecting the wide variation in processing by 
fluid milk distributing plants, the quantity of this 
milk marketed by the AMPI Agency fluctuated 
widely by day of the week, with 50 to 60 percent of the 
week’s total on Friday and Saturday. In May 1976, 
approximately 1.0 million pounds of this milk were 
marketed on an average Saturday, slightly more than 
10 times the amount sold on an average Tuesday or 
Wednesday [10]. As noted earlier, the quantity of 
Agency milk manufactured by Agency plants fol­
lowed a somewhat similar weekly pattern.
Economic Effects o f Surplus Milk Disposal. A  ben­
efit of this service is that fluid milk processors can 
dispose of surplus milk on short notice and with com­
paratively little risk and uncertainty. This is true 
whether the surplus is anticipated or is unexpected, 
as when a distributing plant is closed by a strike.
Also, as with the excess milk associated with sup­
plemental supplies provided to fluid milk processors, 
surplus milk is manufactured at lower cost in these 
specialized m anufacturing facilities than would 
likely be the case if  fluid milk processors manufac­
tured it in their own facilities, or sold it themselves.
On the other hand, in some situations, disposing 
of this surplus milk may be costly to the Agency. 
AMPI maintains a standby facility in Mt. Horeb, 
Wisconsin, for surplus milk that cannot be disposed of
elsewhere. Both in 1974, a year of comparatively 
large surpluses, and 1975, when they were about 
normal, use of these facilities was limited almost 
entirely to a period of approximately 3 months be­
tween mid-April and mid-July. With yearly building 
and equipment costs of around $480,000 [16], AMPI 
incurred estimated fixed costs o f approximately 
$477,000 in 1974 and $392,000 in 1975 at this facility 
during the portions of the year it was not used. These 
costs amounted to approximately 2.7 cents per hun­
dredweight of AMPI member receipts on the Chicago 
order market in 1974 and 2.2 cents in 1975.
AMPI increases the bargaining power of the coop­
eratives by providing standby facilities to handle sur­
plus milk. Because of the benefits to handlers, it is a 
source of "opponent-gain” bargaining power. It also 
adds to cooperatives’ market power by giving them 
outlets to which excess supplies can be diverted or 
withheld from distribution and thus greater control 
over supplies. The ability to withhold or divert sup­
plies is a source of "opponent-pain” bargaining power 
because it would impose additional costs on handlers 
if  carried out.
CMPC Operations
Role in the market
As the overhead federation serving 15 coopera­
tives on the Chicago regional federal order market, 
CMPC prices milk and services for which it is the 
authorized bargaining agent. It is governed by a 
board of 19 directors, consisting of one representative 
from each cooperative with not more than 1500 mem­
bers and one added representative for each additional 
1500 members. Decisions require a 60-percent major­
ity vote of the board.
CMPC establishes prices and service charges for 
about 95 percent of the total and class I milk pooled 
on the Chicago order (table 10). AMPI Agency plants 
are an important part; in 1975 they accounted for 
51 percent of all CMPC milk and for 45 percent of its 
class I sales. Much of the other CMPC milk was 
received from members of the various cooperatives at 
supply and distributing plants of proprietary firms 
not marketing milk through the AMPI Agency.
Because it controls most of the milk on the mar­
ket, CMPC does not have an acute nonmember prob­
lem. Furthermore, it is the only single source of milk
Agency0 197W 5 ta9eS ° f ^  ^  ° laSS ' Chicago order mi,k bar9ained for bV CMPC, and of CMPC milk marketed by the AMPI
Percent of
Year
All milk 
bargained 
for by CMPC
All CMPC milk 
marketed by 
AMPI Agency
All class 1 
milk bargained 
for by CMPC
CMPI class 1 
milk marketed 
by AMPI Agency
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
92.5
93.6
93.9
95.7
94.9
42.5
46.2
50.2
47.4
51.4
92.2
91.9
93.6 
95.0
93.7
30.3
36.9
42.6
42.6
44.9
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pooled on the order that has sufficient volume to 
service the accounts of most of the larger processors. 
Because handlers have access only to limited quan­
tities of nonCMPC milk within the order, the upper 
limit to CMPC’s negotiated class I charge is deter­
mined by the availability and cost of alternate sup­
plies outside the Chicago order. For example, the 
transportation cost saving to Chicago handlers of 
buying CMPC milk rather than outside milk from 
Eau Claire, Wisconsin, a potential alternative source, 
has been approximately 58 cents per hundredweight. 
This amount exceeded CMPC’s net class I charge during 
the years 1971-75.
Advance pricing
CMPC prices member milk received by both coop­
erative and proprietary firms at either supply or 
processing plants at the point of first receipt and 
according to use. Subject to the approval of the CMPC 
board of directors, a price com m ittee issues a 
monthly price announcement to all buyers of regu­
lated milk on the Chicago order. Whether or not the 
price is changed, it usually is announced 2 or 3 weeks 
before the first of the month.
The announcement sets forth the prices and ser­
vice charges applicable to all handlers who receive 
milk from any source for which CMPC is the autho­
rized bargaining agent. The level of these prices and 
charges is not fixed by a predetermined formula. 
Rather, it is based on the Chicago order blend price, 
the cost of operating CMPC marketing programs, an 
assessment of trends in milk production, an appraisal 
of changes in the cost of milk production, and com­
petitive conditions as reflected by prices paid to non­
CMPC producers by handlers who distribute milk in 
any part of the Chicago order marketing area.
Class I  Prices. CMPC announces the price that 
must be paid for milk used in class I products and 
purchased from either direct-ship CMPC producers 
or CMPC supply plants. This price, which is above
the federal order minimum class I price, has been 
called the cooperative price, or superpool price. The 
excess over the federal order class I price long has 
been termed the superpool premium, although coop­
eratives more recently have referred to it as the class I 
charge.
Over the years 1971-75, the class I charge in­
creased from 30 cents per hundredweight of class I 
sales in 1971 and 1972 to 72 cents in 1975 (table 11). If 
there are no credits or adjustments, buyers are billed 
the announced class I charge on the quantity of milk 
purchased from CMPC and used in class I. If a plant 
buys only part of its milk from CMPC, the class I 
charge is billed on that proportionate share of its 
class I sales.
Obligations to CMPC’s pool are determined from 
data in the reports of receipts and utilization filed by 
all regulated handlers with the Chicago order mar­
ket administrator. Handlers who receive milk from 
any CMPC source submit copies of those reports to 
CMPC. Each handler reports to CMPC the volume of 
his class I sales to which the full class I charge is not 
applicable (discussed later). CMPC field staff audit 
those reports.
Credits and Adjustments. Although CMPC con­
trols 95 percent of the milk pooled on the Chicago 
order, it is unable to control either member or non­
member production, particularly the addition of new 
producers to the market. Therefore, in evaluating the 
economic impacts of CMPC’s class I pricing policy, we 
must distinguish between its announced class I 
charges and the net class I charges it collects:
As a result of adjustments, fluid milk processors 
may not pay the entire announced class I  charge. For 
example, buyers of CMPC milk who compete with 
processors who buy milk at a lower price from a 
nonCPMC source receive at least a partial refund of 
the class I charge. This refund is termed a competi­
tive credit. CMPC uses it to reduce its premium 
where necessary to meet competition. CMPC’s intent 
is to adjust the effective level of the premium by the
Table 11. Sources and disposition of CMPC funds per hundredweight of CMPC class I sales, 1971-75.
Item 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Sources of funds 
Announced class I charge 29.7 30.0
cents per hundredweight 
43.3 63.5 71.7
Credits and adjustments 6.5 9.9 10.9 15.2 22.8
Net class I charge 23.2 20.1 32.4 48.3 48.9
Other charges or credits 0.0 0.9 0.5 5.2 0.5
Total8 23.2 21.0 32.9 53.5 49.4
Disposition of funds
Marketing programs 6.6 8.1 7.2 10.0 13.3
Administration 0.6 2.8 3.2 2.5 1.0
Other costs or debits 1.3 0.6 1.2 . 0.0 3.4
Paid to producers 14.7 9.6 21.1 41.0 31.7
Total8 23.2 21.1 32.7 53.5 49.4
Source: [9]
aTotals may not be exactly equal because of rounding.
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use of this credit so a buyer of CMPC milk will be on a 
competitive par regarding price with buyers of non­
CMPC milk with whom he competes for sales.
The competitive credit is made available to deal­
ers who buy all, or nearly all, of their milk from 
CMPC sources. It is the difference between the 
CMPC superpool price and the lower price at which 
milk is purchased by competitors times the quantity 
of milk the processor sells in competition with the 
lower priced milk.
One economic effect of the competitive credit is to 
raise barriers to entry into the market by nonCMPC 
producers. It is a form of limit pricing. By enabling 
CMPC customers to purchase their milk at prices 
equal to those paid by competitors who buy from 
nonCMPC sources, it reduces their incentive to seek 
alternative sources of supply and enables them to 
compete for sales on the basis of their efficiency in 
processing and distribution.
An inner-zone location adjustment on supply- 
plant milk subject to a CMPC class I charge also may 
reduce that charge. It applies to milk received at fluid 
milk processing plants in zones 1, 2, or 3 and mar­
keted as fluid milk products in those zones. The class 
I charge is reduced 4.0 cents per hundredweight on 
receipts in zones 1 and 2, and 2.0 cents on receipts in 
zone 3. Receipts from direct shippers also are eligible 
for this credit if the processor is subsidizing the haul­
ing of that milk by at least 10 cents per hundred­
weight.
The inner-zone adjustment enables buyers of 
CMPC-priced milk in tbe inner zones to apply part of 
the class I charge to the cost of hauling milk sold for 
fluid purposes in those zones. In part, it is a competi­
tive credit granted because some nonCMPC suppliers 
were selling milk in the inner zones at hauling 
charges below those on CMPC milk. Another reason 
for the inner-zone adjustment is that the cost of haul­
ing milk had become greater than the federal order 
transportation allowance. It permits CMPC buyers to 
keep a portion of the CMPC charge to offset some of 
the excess of transportation costs over those met by 
provisions of the order.
Since August 1,1974, an additional adjustment of
5.0 cents per hundredweight was allowed on class I sales 
that were subject to a net class I charge of 60 cents per 
hundredweight or more. This adjustment is reduced
1.0 cent per hundredweight for each 1.0 cent per hun­
dredweight the net class I charge is below 60 cents per 
hundredweight. Thus, it becomes zero if the net class I 
charge is 55 cents per hundredweight or less.6 This 
adjustment had the same effect as a competitive credit 
by allowing CMPC-priced milk to be more competitive 
than otherwise.
Between 1971 and 1975, CMPC’s competitive credits 
and adjustments increased from 6.5 cents to 22.8 cents
During the last four months o f1976, an adjustment of 12 cents per 
hundredweight was to be allowed on a trial basis on class I sales 
subject to a net class I charge of 62 cents per hundredweight or 
more. This adjustment was to be reduced by 1.0 cent per hundred­
weight for each 1.0 cent the net class I charge was below 62 cents 
per hundredweight.
per hundredweight on CMPC class I rates. Credits and 
adjustments increased faster than the announced class 
I charge, with the result that only 69 percent of the 
announced charge was collected in 1975 as against 
71 percent in 1971. In 1975,79 percent of the adjustment 
was competitive credits.
The magnitude of these credits and adjustments 
shows the impact of competition on CMPC’s ability to 
collect class I charges. The increase in competitive cred­
its and adjustments suggests that CMPC has been try­
ing to raise class I charges at a rate faster than charges 
have been increased on milk sold by nonCMPC pro­
ducers. It also illustrates how supply response by non­
CMPC producers tends to depress prices bargained for 
by CMPC.
In 1974 and 1975, CMPC’s class I pricing policy 
raised the average price of class I milk to fluid milk 
processors between 48 and 49 cents per hundredweight. 
From 1971 to 1975, the net CMPC class I charge aver­
aged 35 cents per hundredweight. This was a premium 
of approximately 3 cents per gallon, or 5 percent of the 
class I price.
To processors, one favorable aspect of CMPC pricing 
is that its price changes less frequently than the federal 
order price. For example, between July 1, 1973, and 
April 5,1976, the federal order class I price changed 28 
times while CMPC changed its announced price only 17 
times. Less frequent class I price changes are advan­
tageous to processors because they reduce the amount of 
price negotiation between them and their customers.
Another aspect of CMPC’s pricing policy evidently 
intended to be attractive to processors has been the size 
of the increments by which it raised prices. CMPC 
changes its announced price by 15 cents per hundred­
weight or a multiple thereof. Since there are approx­
imately 23 half-gallons of milk in a hundredweight, a 
price increase of 15 cents per hundredweight allows 
processors to raise their price by 1.0 cent per half-gallon 
and to have approximately 8 cents per hundredweight 
to meet other increased costs. In addition, price in­
creases that require processors to raise prices more than
1.0 cent per half-gallon may result in adverse publicity.
Class II Prices. Since August 1,1974, CMPC’s ad­
vance pricing program has included not only class I 
milk but also milk used in all class II products except 
ice cream, class II frozen desserts, commercial food 
establishment sales, and condensed or dried skim 
milk used in class II products, plus class III baker’s 
cheese. CMPC announces prices to be paid for these 
products at the same time it announces the class I 
price. The price of milk used in baker’s cheese is 10 
cents per hundredweight below the class II price. 
CMPC allows competitive credits to these prices in 
the same way and for the same reason that it allows 
competitive credits on class I milk.
CMPC does not intend to produce added income 
for producers through this program. The prices an­
nounced under the program sometimes are above and 
sometimes are below federal order prices. When the 
price is above the federal order price, the difference is 
a credit to CMPC; when it is below, the difference is a 
charge against the CMPC superpool fund.
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The purpose of this program is to establish, over 
time, prices for class II milk and for class III milk 
used in baker’s cheese that are (1) known to handlers 
in advance of those established by the federal order, 
(2) more stable than order prices, and (3) sufficiently 
above federal order prices to provide the revenue 
needed to fund CMPC’s location adjustment pay­
ments on milk used in class II and III products.
Under the provisions of the order, a processor is 
allowed a location adjustment of 2.0 cents per hun­
dredweight on 110 percent of the milk he uses in class
I for each 15 miles the milk is hauled. He does not 
receive this adjustment on any milk he uses in class II 
products in excess of 10 percent of his class I usage. In 
contrast, CMPC allows a location adjustment at that 
rate on all class II and III milk it prices in advance. 
This adjustment may indirectly benefit CMPC pro­
ducers by making processors more willing to buy 
CMPC milk.
Processors benefit from this program by knowing 
in advance the cost of the milk they use in those class
II and III products it covers. This relieves them of the 
uncertainty experienced under the federal order, 
which does not price milk used in these products until 
the following month. In addition, some processors 
benefit from  the location  adjustm ent, w ith the 
amount of benefit depending upon the extent to 
which milk usage in these products exceeds 10 per­
cent of that in class I and upon the distance the milk 
is hauled to their plants.
Handling charges
CMPC adds handling or service charges to the 
class I price it quotes. A fee of 2.5 cents per hundred­
weight is added to the price of all milk sold by CMPC. 
This fee is imposed by the market administrator to 
cover the expense of operating the order. Other CMPC 
handling charges vary depending upon the arrange­
ment under which milk is purchased.
Direct-Ship Premium. A  charge of 5.0 cents per 
hundredweight is made on all CMPC producer milk 
shipped directly to a distributing plant, regardless of 
the use made of it. Some milk received by nearby 
supply plants before delivery to the distributing 
plant is treated as direct-shipped milk for the purpose 
of collecting this charge.
CMPC credits buyers with this direct-ship charge so 
they may pay it to producers. The intent is to improve 
producer equity by partly compensating direct-ship 
producers for the amounts that regulated producers 
who ship to manufacturing plants receive in patronage 
refunds or premiums. The charge returns to direct-ship 
producers some of the saving that processors make by 
receiving direct-shipped rather than supply-plant milk.
CMPC charges direct-ship premiums on approx­
imately one-fourth of its total sales. From 1971 
through 1975 these premiums averaged 3.2 cents per 
hundredweight of class I sales (table 11) or 1.3 cents 
per hundredweight on all producer milk sold by 
CMPC.
Supply-Plant Charge. In 1976, processing plants 
were purchasing supply-plant milk under three dif­
ferent options. To honor previous commitments, a 
small amount was being sold to processors who 
agreed to receive milk daily at a charge of 18 cents per 
hundredweight. However, more than 90 percent of 
CMPC’s supply-plant milk, including practically all 
from AMPI Agency plants, was sold to processors on 
time schedules they specified. The service charge for 
that milk was 22.5 cents per hundredweight unless 
delivered in loads of less than 27,000 pounds. Under 
the third option, small amounts occasionally were 
sold to processors who normally did not buy CMPC 
milk at a service charge of 37.5 cents per hundred­
weight. The greater charge on this milk recognized 
the extra cost to supply plants of servicing unex­
pected orders and that processors who bought milk 
from CMPC only on an irregular basis should pay a 
higher price. Aside from these options, a processor 
could arrange for other services, such as quality work 
or making payment to producers, at added cost.
In 1975, CMPC supply plants collected the 22.5-cent 
service charge on an estimated 15 percent of CMPC’s 
total sales. Supply-plant charges were equivalent to 9.8 
cents per hundredweight of CMPC class I sales or 3.5 
cents per hundredweight on all CMPC sales. This was 
an extra charge to fluid milk processors for services, 
above the CMPC superpool premium. We do not know 
what service charges supply plants might have made in 
the absence of CMPC. It is conceivable that they might 
have made some, especially in months when there was 
no federal order shipping requirement for pooling or in 
periods when the supply plant already had shipped 
enough milk to qualify on the order for that month.
Service charges were remitted directly to supply 
plants as partial compensation for their costs of receiv­
ing, storing, and cooling the milk and transferring it to 
processors. All cooperative members of CMPC levied 
the announced handling charges on any supply-plant 
milk they sold to fluid milk processors. The AMPI 
Agency levied them on milk from proprietary as well as 
cooperative supply plants. Except for the 5.0-cent, di­
rect-ship charge, other proprietary supply plants estab­
lished their own service charges, although CMPC 
collected the class I, II, or m  charges on milk that was 
received at those supply plants and shipped to distribut­
ing plants.
The handling charges of supply plants whose milk is 
not priced through the CMPC are of concern to CMPC 
because such milk competes with CMPC milk on a 
total-price basis, including service charges. The Na­
tional Farmers’ Organization is the main competitor on 
the Chicago market. Some of its handling charges are 
below those of CMPC. CMPC gives a competitive credit 
amounting to half to two-thirds the difference, believ­
ing that the quality of its product and its services are 
sufficiently good that a full competitive credit is not 
needed.
The most obvious effect of CMPC’s handling charges 
is that they increase the price of milk to its customers. 
Their justification would seem to depend on the ac­
curacy with which they reflect benefits to dealers and 
the costs of providing them.
CMPC’s service charge policy has equity implica­
tions. Those who benefit from a service pay for it, and
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those who incur extra costs to provide a service receive 
the payment. These equity conditions might not have 
been satisfied in the absence of the CMPC.
Marketing programs
Revenue from the net class I charge, together with 
smaller amounts from positive net class II charges, 
interest, funds carried over from the previous pool, 
and other sources, goes into the CMPC superpool 
fund (fig. 4). These funds are used to pay the costs of 
marketing programs, administrative expenses, and a 
carryover to the next period’s pool. Any funds remain­
ing are distributed to CMPC producers.
Except for amounts paid to producers, CMPC’s 
largest expenditures o f superpool premiums have 
been for marketing programs. The rate of expendi­
ture on these programs doubled between 1971 and 1975, 
from 6.6 cents per hundredweight of class I sales to 13.3 
cents (table 11). These amounts were a little more than 
one-fourth of the net class I charge. Total expenditures 
on marketing programs by the CMPC are limited to a 
maximum of 15 cents per hundredweight of its class I 
sales.
The various marketing programs are considered in 
this section. They include advertising, contributions to 
the standby pool, surplus milk pricing, payments to 
manufacturing plants, milk replacement, skim milk 
purchase credits, small-load delivery credits, and pay­
ment of marketing fees.
Advertising. CMPC promoted fluid milk products 
in areas in which its class I sales are marketed, 
mostly through generic advertising. In 1976, 2.0 cents
per hundredweight of class I sales was made available to 
agencies such as Milk Foundation, Inc., in Chicago, and 
Wisconsin Dairy Council for advertising and promo­
tion. This program was intended to increase demand, 
and, to the extent that it did so, it benefited handlers as 
well as producers. It was not operated in areas such as 
central-southwestern Wisconsin in which a substantial 
proportion of the producers were nonCMPC members 
who often undercut CMPC prices.
Contributions to the Standby Pool. The standby 
pool, known form ally as the Associated Reserve 
Standby Pool Cooperative (ARSPC), is a program 
supported by a federation o f cooperatives. The 
standby pool is a voluntary supply-management pro­
gram in which member cooperatives in markets with 
little surplus m ilk pay Minnesota and Wisconsin 
plants that have surplus grade A milk at all times to 
provide milk to member cooperatives when and as 
needed [18]. Since the standby plants became regu­
lated under the Upper Midwest federal order, they 
have received from the standby pool supplementary 
payments sufficient to equalize their blend prices 
with the prices they would have received if  qualified 
on the Chicago federal order, including over-order 
payments. CMPC, although not an official member of 
ARSPC, contributes to it, as members do, 1.0 cent per 
hundredweight of class I sales. Over the years 1971-75, 
CMPC’s annual contribution averaged $634,000 [19].
The standby pool is a bargaining device used by 
cooperatives to increase their bargaining power in two 
ways. Most important to CMPC, by maintaining the 
standby pool, member cooperatives have greater control 
over their local market’s milk supply. Because milk
f>9- 4. Overview of the sources and disposition of CMPC superpooi funds. Source: [9].
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from standby plants does not enter its market unless 
called for, CMPC can raise the class I price without 
concern about milk from the standby plants entering 
the market. This program benefits CMPC at the ex­
pense of those who buy milk, including consumers.
Also, although seldom needed on the Chicago mar­
ket, cooperatives that support the standby pool can 
obtain supplementary milk at the standby plant’s local 
federal order price plus a handling charge of 
70 cents per hundredweight. Thus cooperatives in mar­
kets with more limited supplies can ensure their buyers 
of all milk needed for class I use at all times. Distressed 
processors do not have to pay exorbitant prices and 
handling charges for supplementary milk, as some have 
in the past.
Surplus Milk Pricing. CMPC sets aside about
0.5 cent per hundredweight of its class I sales charge 
to finance its surplus milk pricing program, which 
operates during the months of April-July. CMPC 
milk delivered to receiving stations or reload points, 
or direct-shipped to distributing plants, is eligible for 
the program. In 1976, approximately 99 percent of 
the surplus milk priced through the program came 
from 14 distributing plants and their affiliated re­
ceiving stations. This milk is the nonAgency surplus 
handled by the AMPI Agency.
CMPC guarantees an eligible handler a price for 
surplus milk of 10.5 cents per hundredweight above 
the federal order price of the milk at his plant plus 
any transportation cost of getting the milk to the 
buyer. The federal order price is the blend price if  the 
milk is diverted to a pooled manufacturing plant, the 
class I price if to a pooled distributing plant, or the 
class II or III price, whichever is applicable, if the 
milk is manufactured into a class II or III product at a 
nonpool plant. The 10.5-cent payment is intended to 
cover the 2.5-cent-per-hundredweight market ad­
ministrator’s assessment, the 5.0-cent-direct-ship 
premium, if  applicable, and costs such as those for 
shrinkage and field service. Handlers need not sell 
their surplus milk through CMPC, but usually do so 
if they can’t sell it independently for a higher price.
Within CMPC, an operating surplus committee 
establishes prices on a weekly basis during the flush 
period that CMPC manufacturing plants must pay 
for surplus milk purchased under the program. Prod­
uct formulas are used to set these prices at levels that 
depend on products made and their selling prices.
In guaranteeing a price for surplus milk, CMPC 
pays a handler only enough to make his effective 
selling price 10.5 cents per hundredweight above the 
order price net of transportation cost. If CMPC is able 
to sell the milk at a price that returns more than that 
amount, it diverts the excess into its superpool fund. 
In the years 1972-76, however, 1973, a year of rela­
tively high prices for manufactured dairy products, 
was the only one in which CMPC netted a profit on 
this program (table 12). In the other years, it experi­
enced losses averaging roughly 20 cents per hundred­
weight of surplus milk.
Losses incurred by CMPC on this program clearly 
benefit the distributing plants and affiliated supply
Table 12. Quantity of surplus milk sold through CMPC’s surplus 
milk pricing program and CMPC’s loss or gain on it, total and 
per hundredweight, April-July, 1972-76.
Year
Quantity,
1,000 pounds
Loss ( - )  or Gain ( + ) on program
Total,
dollars
Per 100 pounds of 
surplus milk, cents
1972a 73 ,852 -1 4 3 ,8 9 9 - 1 9 . 5
1973b 7 ,257 +  708 +  1.0
1974a 53 ,466 -  96 ,289 - 1 8 . 0
1975 27 ,052 -  56 ,854 - 2 1 . 0
1976 49 ,132 -1 0 6 ,3 3 2 - 2 1 . 6
Source: [9] 
starting April 15 
bApril 15 through July 15
plants that market milk through the program. Dur­
ing 1972-76, these benefits averaged 0.3 cent per hun­
dredweight of CMPC’s class I sales, or 19.1 cents per 
hundredweight of surplus milk sold through CMPC. 
This is another example of CMPC using part of the 
net class I charge it collects from handlers to pay for a 
service to them. By enabling handlers to market 
surplus milk without a loss, the cooperatives that 
constitute CMPC strengthen their bargaining power 
with those handlers.
Manufacturing-Plant Payments. This program 
aims to share, on a marketwide basis, the costs of 
operating facilities that stand ready to process sur­
plus milk into manufactured products whenever nec­
essary during the period of flush production. These 
manufacturing plants have considerable excess ca­
pacity during the period of low production, when they 
ship a relatively large percentage of their milk to 
distributing plants for class I use.
Regulated manufacturing plants that participate 
in the program receive 15 cents per hundredweight 
from CMPC for shipments of whole milk to bottling 
plants other than their own which are in excess of 21 
percent of their total regulated producer receipts. To 
receive the payment, a plant must:
1. Have a grade A milk supply that is at least 50 
percent Chicago inspected.
2. Have a daily intake of at least 47,000 pounds (a 
tanker load) of grade A Chicago-inspected milk.
3. Agree to ship 100 percent of its regulated grade 
A milk on call to CMPC through the AMPI Agency on 
a pro rata basis during each month of the year.
4. Maintain facilities capable of manufacturing its 
largest daily volume of receipts into storable man­
ufactured dairy products. These requirements are 
intended to limit the 15-cent payment to those plants 
that contribute significantly to the fluid and balanc­
ing needs of the market either by shipping milk when 
it is needed for fluid use or by manufacturing surplus, 
or both. This payment supplements the 22.5-cent ser­
vice charge as additional compensation to supply 
plants for providing supplementary supplies and 
handling surplus. During 1971-75, the cost to CMPC 
averaged 0.4 cent per hundredweight of CMPC’s class 
I sales.
Skim Milk Credit. Since manufacturing plant
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payments are based only on a plant’s shipments of 
whole milk, plants in that program may inflate prices 
that they charge fluid milk processors for skim milk, 
on which the charge is not made. To adjust for that, 
CMPC allows a fluid milk processing plant a credit of 
15 cents per hundredweight on skim milk purchased 
from CMPC-affiliated supply plants and used in class 
I products. During 1971-75, the cost of this program to 
CMPC averaged 0.8 cent per hundredweight of CMPC 
class I sales.
Like some other aspects of the marketing program, 
this program is designed to protect processing plants 
that buy CMPC skim milk from being placed at a 
competitive disadvantage due to CMPC’s pricing pol­
icies. It may provide a net benefit to some of those 
customers if the price they pay for skim milk is not 
inflated as much as the credit.
Milk Replacement. The intent of this program is to 
replace supplies that buyers o f CMPC direct-ship 
milk lose to competitors who have a price advantage 
as a result of CMPC’s pricing policy. If a processor 
loses CMPC direct-shipped milk for this reason, 
CMPC agrees to replace that milk for as long as the 
processor wants it at the price he would have paid if 
he continued to receive the direct-shipped milk. How­
ever, milk is not replaced to the extent that the pro­
cessor will have a surplus going into class III bulk 
sales.
Little use was made of this program in 1976. Con­
sequently, its cost to CMPC was less than 0.1 cent per 
100 pounds of its class I sales.
This program reduces the reluctance of high class 
I utilization handlers to buy CMPC milk. It is an­
other service paid for out of the net class I charge that 
directly benefits CMPC customers and strengthens 
CMPC’s bargaining power.
Small-Load Credit. CMPC allows a small-load 
credit of 3.0 cents per 100 pounds of CMPC-priced 
milk sold to milk processors in loads of less than
27,000 pounds. This credit exactly equals the added 
handling charge on small loads, thereby equalizing 
charges to large and small bottlers. During 1971-75, 
the cost of this program averaged less than 0.1 cent 
per hundredweight of class I sales.
Marketing Fees. A  supply plant selling milk for 
fluid use must have a marketing staff for activities 
associated with marketing the milk and occasionally 
may absorb bad debts. CMPC pays its cooperative 
members a marketing fee on milk for which they bear 
the cost of such functions. Most of the marketing 
functions, on both fluid and surplus milk, are per­
formed by the AMPI Agency for a fee of 2.0 cents per 
hundredweight on all CMPC-priced milk. Other co­
operatives receive similar fees for milk on which they 
perform similar functions, including milk they pro­
cess into fluid products in their own distribution 
plants. But any milk on which cooperatives receive 
the 15-cent-per-hundredweight manufacturing-plant 
Payment is not eligible for this marketing fee. During 
1971-75, this was the most costly of CMPC’s market­
ing programs, averaging 3.3 cents per hundredweight of 
CMPC class I sales.
Producer distribution
Each month all CMPC funds remaining after al­
lowing for marketing program expenses, money to be 
carried forward to the next month’s pool, direct ship 
payments, administrative expense, and class II pric­
ing losses are distributed to producers. This re­
mainder is distributed under two or three different 
arrangements.
Supply-Plant Perform ance Payments. In ter­
mittently, beginning in August 1973, part of the 
funds to be allocated to producers was distributed to 
supply-plant producers on the basis of their plant’s 
shipping performance. Each month CMPC would es­
timate the volume of producer receipts and needed 
shipments to fluid milk processors for the following 
month. If the shipping percentage believed needed 
from affiliated supply plants exceeded federal order 
minima, CMPC would announce a maximum pay­
ment to its affiliated supply plants that shipped at 
least a specified percentage of their total receipts. 
Supply plants that shipped only the federal order 
minimum percentage received no payment; those 
that shipped more than the federal order minimum 
but less than CMPC’s announced minimum received 
partial payments.
The intent of this payment is to provide incentive 
to supply plants to ship increased proportions of their 
milk when it is most needed by processors. When it 
seems that supply plants will ship processors enough 
milk under qualification provisions o f the order, 
CMPC discontinues this method o f distribution. 
When used, the effects of this program are similar to 
those of supply-plant charges and manufacturing- 
plant payments.
Individual-Handler Distribution. In November 
1973, CMPC began to operate another distribution 
program. Under this program, CMPC distributed 20 
percent of the net class I charge made against a plant 
to CMPC producers delivering milk to that plant.
One purpose of this program was to encourage 
handlers to maintain class I sales by allowing them to 
keep 20 percent of their net class I charge for distribu­
tion to CMPC producers who supplied them. Another 
purpose was to improve producer equity by increas­
ing the returns to producers who delivered their milk 
to the market for class I use. These producers shared 
returns from class I sales with other producers 
through the producer settlement fund, but may have 
received relatively lower prices than producers who 
delivered to regulated manufacturing plants, partic­
ularly cheese plants. The latter frequently were paid 
patronage refunds made possible by their plants’ par­
ticipation in the order.
Uniform Payments to Producers. The balance of 
the funds was distributed uniformly to all CMPC 
producers. Any Chicago order plant that purchased 
less than 100 percent of its class I needs from CMPC 
and did not file reports for auditing with CMPC was 
presumed to be liable for the full class I charge on all 
class I milk it purchased from CMPC. If CMPC deter­
mined, through audit of producer payrolls, that a 
processor had been paying less than the minimum
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CMPC price to producers, he was sent a notice of 
underpayment.
Other economic aspects of CMPC services
The discussion up to now has not considered the 
economic effects of the higher prices for milk result­
ing from CMPC activities upon processors, consum­
ers, or producers. That is the topic of this section.
Effects on Processors and Consumers. The average 
net class I charge over the years 1969-75 was 26.5 
cents per hundredweight, or 3.1 cents per gallon. 
That amount, here termed the short-run effect, in­
creased the price of class I milk to fluid milk pro­
cessors by 3.9 percent above the federal order price.
During that period, total class I sales on the Chi­
cago regional federal order market decreased 11.3 
percent, an average of 1.9 percent per year (table 2). If 
we assume the price elasticity of the demand for fluid 
milk by consumers was -0.28 [20], class I sales could 
have declined an average of 1.09 percent per year as a 
result of CMPC class I prices being above federal 
order prices. This suggests that slightly more than 
half of the decline in class I sales might have been 
attributed to consumer response to the higher price 
resulting from the net class I charge.
By 1975, the net class I charge was 48.9 cents per 
100 pounds of class I milk. We might define this as the 
cumulative or long-run effect of CMPC activities— 
that is, the extent to which by 1975 CMPC was able to 
raise the class I price above the federal order level as a 
result of its past bargaining activities. In 1975 this 
premium amounted to 5.7 percent of the federal order 
price. Although its specific effect would depend upon 
assumptions made as to the length of time it needed 
to have existed, this higher premium evidently could 
have contributed to an even greater reduction in con­
sumption than the short-run effect considered pre­
viously.
In addition, CMPC was making service charges 
that in 1975 totaled 13.0 cents per hundredweight of 
class I milk. It was indicated earlier that services 
processors received in return for these charges, such 
as providing supplementary milk and disposing of 
surplus milk, could be performed more efficiently by 
a federation of cooperatives than by individual fluid 
milk processors. Consequently, if  the charges made 
by CMPC did not exceed the cost to processors of 
performing the services they received, those charges 
did not increase the cost of milk to consumers. On the 
other hand if, before CMPC was involved, some of 
these services were provided to processors at no 
charge, or at a smaller charge than CMPC made for 
them, these service charges also could have raised 
milk prices during this period, and so reduced con­
sumption.
Aside from the effect upon consumption, we also 
must consider possible losses of sales by processors 
who purchased CMPC milk to processors who pur­
chased lower priced milk from other sources. Be­
tween 1969 and 1975, Chicago order handlers’ share 
of class I sales within the marketing area declined 
from 97.8 percent to 94.4 percent [8]. This suggests
that CMPC credits and adjustments did not com­
pletely equalize the cost of milk to CMPC and non- 
CMPC competing handlers. Part of the competitive 
disadvantage of CMPC handlers was due to Chicago 
order pricing of milk at the point of first receipt 
rather than FOB the processing plant, while trans­
portation allowances under the order were inade­
quate to cover actual transportation costs [9].
Effect on Price to Producers. During the 1969-75 
period, the net class I charge raised the average blend 
price to producers by 10.6 cents per hundredweight 
above the federal order price, an increase of 1.7 per­
cent. By 1975, the net class I charge added 17.5 cents 
per hundredweight, or 2.2 percent to the federal order 
price. If, however, we take into account the presumed 
effects of the increased prices during 1969-74 on pro­
duction and consumption, the net addition to price in 
1975 was less than these figures indicate. For exam­
ple, if we assume that half of the increase in milk 
supplies on the order and half the drop in class I sales 
between 1969 and 1975 were attributable to the 
higher prices obtained by CMPC during that period, 
we estimate that the net premium in 1975 would have 
been 13.5 cents per hundredweight, or 1.7 percent of 
the federal order price. Or, if  we assume that all the 
increase in producer receipts and decline in class I 
sales were attributable to the premiums obtained by 
CMPC in earlier years, we conclude that the blend 
price in 1975 was only 7.5 cents per hundredweight, 
or 0.9 percent, higher than it would have been with­
out CMPC.
These estimates give some indication of the range 
within which the actual effect of CMPC activities on 
producer prices in 1975 probably fell. Any decision as 
to where the actual effect was within that range is a 
matter of judgment. It should be noted, however, that 
the responsiveness of supply probably was increased 
because, to a large extent, increases in producer re­
ceipts involved conversion of grade B milk to grade A. 
This conversion probably was more responsive to rel­
atively small increases in price than the output of 
existing grade A producers would have been.
The response in producer deliveries was substan­
tial. Between 1969 and 1975, while class I sales de­
clined by 11.3 percent, producer receipts increased by 
24.4 percent [2]. The resulting sharp increase in the 
amount of excess milk on the market is believed to 
have resulted from the combination of a too-wide 
class I differential, over-order pricing by CMPC, and 
lenient plant qualification requirements, which pre­
sumably helped to account for the increase of 110 per­
cent in the number of supply plants pooled on the 
order between 1969 and 1975. Additional research is 
needed to determine how performance in the market 
would be affected by modification of these policies.
Associated with the increase in supplies has been 
an obvious change in the geographic pattern of pro­
ducer prices. In accord with long-established princi­
ples of milk pricing, transportation allowances pre­
scribed by the federal order supposedly result in the 
blend price being highest in the inner zone of the 
market and declining as distance to market increases 
[21,1]. In the later years of this study, however, Chi-
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cago-order producers in the surplus-producing areas 
of Wisconsin were receiving higher prices, often by 10 
cents per hundredweight, than producers in zone 1. 
These premiums tended to be higher in the fall than 
in the spring [9]. This geographical pattern suggests 
that the combination of CMPC’s supply plant charge 
and manufacturing-plant payments may have over­
compensated outer-zone suppliers in comparison 
with the rather small direct-ship premium on prices 
to inner-zone producers. This has resulted in some 
regulated cheese m anufacturing plants, located 
mostly in the outer zones, being able to procure class 
III milk under the order at prices below the prevailing 
price for grade B milk.
Inner-zone milk production historically has been 
used almost exclusively in class I products. Under 
federal order regulations, which have been influ­
enced by the cooperatives in the market and the 
cooperatives’ pricing policies, nearby producers now 
seemingly are penalized, not only by the need to 
share the fluid market with large numbers of outly­
ing producers, but also by pricing provisions that 
favor outer-zone producers. The cooperatives’ pro­
ducer distribution program is, at least in part, in­
tended to deal with these problems.
Summary and Conclusions
This case study is concerned with the activities of 
cooperative federations in marketing milk in the Chi­
cago regional federal order market. It describes those 
activities and evaluates their effects on processors, 
consumers, and producers.
The Chicago regional federal order marketing area 
encompasses approximately the northern one-fifth of 
Illinois and southern and most of eastern Wisconsin. 
Population centers include metropolitan Chicago, Mil­
waukee, Madison, Rockford, and smaller cities in south­
ern and eastern Wisconsin.
Annual producer receipts under the order increased 
from 7.1 billion pounds in 1969 to 10.2 billion pounds in 
1978. The rate of increase exceeded the average for all 
federal order markets, and since 1976 producer receipts 
in the market have been larger than those in any other 
federal order market. More than 90 percent of the re­
ceipts originate in Wisconsin. Much of the recent in­
crease has represented conversion from the production 
of grade B to grade A milk by dairymen in that state.
The annual quantity of milk used in class I products 
in the market decreased by approximately 600 million 
pounds, or 16 percent, between 1969 and 1978, and the 
proportion of producer receipts so used dropped from 51 
percent to 30 percent. The large and increasing quan­
tity of excess milk is manufactured, primarily into 
cheese.
This large and growing surplus of milk on the mar­
ket influences cooperative bargaining activities, partic­
ularly since substantial additional quantities of man­
ufacturing-grade milk in Wisconsin are potentially 
available to increase market receipts still further. Coop­
erative bargaining activities also are complicated by 
some differences in goals among cooperatives belonging
to the same federation. In general, operating coopera­
tives desire to qualify for the order while keeping as 
much of their milk as possible for manufacture, but 
bargaining cooperatives are mainly concerned with 
marketing fluid-grade milk. Other factors, such as sea­
sonal variation in production and in class I sales and 
wide day-of-the-week fluctuations in processing and 
sales, also add to the difficulty of adjusting milk sup­
plies to market needs.
' During the early 1970s, some 98 percent of the milk 
receipts on the Chicago order market was from mem­
bers of cooperatives. In 1975, about two-fifths each of the 
cooperative milk was from members of operating and of 
combination-type cooperatives and one-fifth from mem­
bers of bargaining associations. Roughly half of the 
milk from cooperative producers was received at plants 
operated by cooperatives and half at proprietary plants. 
More than 75 percent of all order milk as well as more 
than 90 percent of the order milk received by coopera­
tive plants was delivered to supply plants.
Nearly all the cooperative milk is marketed through 
federations. The largest of these, Central Milk Pro­
ducers Cooperative (CMPC), includes all the largest 
cooperatives and all cooperatives that belong to any 
federation. In 1975 its members supplied 95 percent of 
the market’s milk. Its activities include advance pricing 
of milk, establishing service charges, implementing 
marketing programs, and allocating returns among 
producers.
A second major organization is Central Milk Sales 
Agency (CMSA), an unincorporated organization of 
seven operating and combination-type cooperatives, in­
cluding the largest one in the market, Associated Milk 
Producers, Inc. (AMPI). AMPI is the service arm for 
CMSA and 15 proprietary suppliers, being referred to 
when it does so as the AMPI Agency. Its functions are (1) 
qualifying affiliated supply plants, (2) providing sup­
plemental milk to processors, and (3) disposing of pro­
cessors’ surplus milk. CMSA cooperatives accounted for 
80 percent of all AMPI Agency milk, which was slightly 
more than half of all milk marketed by CMPC.
For milk to be regulated under the marketing order, 
it must be received by qualified plants. Fluid milk 
processing plants are qualified by marketing at least a 
specified minimum percentage of their grade A receipts 
in fluid milk products and in the marketing area. Sup­
ply plants qualify by shipping specified seasonally vari­
able minimum percentages, or more, of their receipts to 
regulated processing plants. Qualification provisions of 
the Chicago order permit plants of one or more coopera­
tives to qualify as a unit. This reduces by approximately 
one-half the shipping percentages for individual plants, 
but does not reduce them for the unit as a whole.
One function of the AMPI Agency was to qualify 
affiliated supply plants. Agency firms needed to qualify 
to compete effectively for producers. Dwindling sup­
plies of grade B milk, attributable at least in part to 
federal order and cooperative pricing policies, forced 
plants to obtain grade A milk to have sufficient volume 
to operate manufacturing facilities efficiently. Also, 
pooled plants could obtain milk used in manufacturing 
cheese more cheaply, by 48 to 69 cents per hundred­
weight in 1976, than could nonpooled plants.
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Firms affiliated with the AMPI Agency were willing 
to provide supplementary milk to fluid processors and 
to manufacture milk in excess of fluid needs for the 
AMPI Agency to qualify their supply plants. Collective 
marketing of their milk ensured individual plants of 
pooled status, promoted market stability, and strength­
ened their bargaining power.
The unit-qualification rule induced supply plants to 
become pooled collectively. Unit qualifications made 
possible marketwide as well as individual plant savings 
in transportation and in manufacturing costs. It did this 
by facilitating relatively heavier shipments to pro­
cessors from nearby than from distant plants and by 
allowing manufacturing plants to keep as much of their 
milk as possible for manufacture.
A second major function of the AMPI Agency was to 
coordinate provision of supplemental milk on order by 
its plants to 13 fluid milk processing operations in met­
ropolitan Chicago. These shipments constituted an in­
creasing proportion of the market’s class I milk as 
supplies from direct-ship producers declined. Season­
ally, these shipments fluctuated widely; in 1976 the 
peak volume in October was nearly twice that in June. 
The bulk of the shipments was on Monday-Thursday. 
This indicates that Agency plants were supplementing 
processors’ milk supplies from other sources on not only 
a seasonal basis but also a weekly basis. This function 
minimized processors’ risk and uncertainty in obtain­
ing needed supplies of milk. By performing this func­
tion for them and minim izing their surpluses, it 
enabled them to specialize in processing and distribu­
tion. In return, processors were made more dependent 
upon the Agency for milk and were required to pay 
prices and service charges set by the cooperative. 
Agency members incurred added costs in supplying 
milk in conformity with the seasonal and day-of-the- 
week patterns of need. Marketwide, however, signifi­
cant savings were achieved because a centralized 
agency could meet needs with a smaller overall reserve 
of milk than individual plants would have required, and 
Agency plants could manufacture surplus milk more 
efficiently than most processors.
AMPI Agency also sold milk to manufacturing 
plants that processors received from direct-ship pro­
ducers and receiving stations in excess of their needs. 
These sales, which were much heavier on weekends 
than during midweek, were made during April-July. 
While the Agency could perform this function more 
efficiently than individual processors, it incurred sub­
stantial costs in strengthening cooperative bargaining 
power in this way.
The seven cooperatives of CMSA serviced by the 
AMPI Agency and eight other cooperatives have bar­
gained with handlers through the CMPC federation. 
CMPC established prices and service charges for about 
95 percent of the total and class I milk on the order. It 
was in relatively good position to do this because it was 
the only single source of milk with sufficient volume to 
service most of the largest processors.
One of its major activities was advance pricing of 
milk. Class I milk was priced above the federal order 
minimum. The excess price, termed superpool premium
or, more recently, class I charge, increased from 30 cents 
per hundredweight in 1972 to 72 cents in 1975. Com­
petitive credits and adjustments, granted to impede 
entry by nonCMPC milk, reduced this charge by 20 to 
30 percent. Between 1971 and 1975, these credits in­
creased faster than the class I charge, indicating the 
depressing effect of nonCMPC competition. Neverthe­
less, the net class I charge increased from slightly more 
than 20 cents per hundredweight in 1971 and 1972 to 
about 48 cents in 1974 and 1975. Two aspects of this 
policy considered somewhat favorable to processors 
were that it reduced the frequency of class I price 
changes and that price increments were 15 cents per 
hundredweight or a multiple thereof, permitting pro­
cessors to recoup some rise in other costs as well as milk 
when the price was increased.
CMPC also advance-priced milk used in some class 
II products and in class III baker’s cheese in much the 
same manner as it did for class I milk. The purposes 
were to price this milk before rather than after it was 
used, to stabilize prices, and to obtain a small premium 
to finance CMPC’s location adjustment credits on milk 
used in those products.
CMPC also established service charges for milk 
purchased from CMPC cooperatives. A charge of 5.0 
cents per hundredweight on direct-shipped milk, which 
processors paid to producers who supplied it, was 
intended to compensate producers for part of the assem­
bly cost savings and lack of opportunity for patronage 
refunds associated with direct shipping. A supply-plant 
charge of 22.5 cents per hundredweight partly compen­
sated these plants for their cost of receiving, cooling, 
and storing milk and marketing it to processors.
Revenue from the net class I charge and smaller 
amounts from other sources went into the CMPC super­
pool fund. Part of this fund financed CMPC’s marketing 
programs, administrative expenses, and the like, with 
the balance being paid to producers.
Some marketing programs, such as surplus milk 
pricing, credit on skim milk and small-load purchases, 
and milk replacement, together costing an average of 
1.1 cents per hundredweight of class I sales, directly 
benefited handlers and, in effect, represented a partial 
refund of the class I charge to them. Most important of 
these was the surplus milk pricing program in which 
CMPC guaranteed processors 10.5 cents per hundred­
weight above the federal order price for surplus milk 
from CMPC direct-ship producers and receiving sta­
tions that was marketed by the AMPI Agency.
Among other payments from the fund was one of 15 
cents per hundredweight to manufacturing plants of 
member cooperatives, which helped to adjust supplies of 
milk to market needs on shipments of whole milk to 
processors in excess of 21 percent of their producer 
receipts. Likewise, expenditures were made for adver­
tising fluid milk products in areas where CMPC milk 
reached consumers. CMPC also drew from the fund to 
support the standby pool, thereby preventing entry into 
the market by plants in the pool and ensuring emer­
gency supplies of milk at reasonable cost if needed. The 
largest expense from the fund was for payment of a 
marketing fee, normally 2.0 cents per hundredweight,
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to the AMPI Agency and other cooperatives that per­
formed marketing services.
Superpool funds remaining after financing the mar­
keting programs and meeting certain other needs were 
distributed to producers under two or three different 
arrangements. Since late 1973,20 percent of the class I 
charge paid by a processing plant was distributed to 
CMPC producers who supplied that plant. In periods of 
shortage, part of the fund has been distributed to pro­
ducers of supply plants that shipped more than federal 
order minimum requirements. The remainder of the 
fund was distributed uniformly to all CMPC producers.
During the 1969-75 period, the class I charge raised 
the blend price to producers by an average of 10.6 cents 
per hundredweight, or 1.7 percent. The long-run effect 
on the blend price, however, was influenced by the re­
sponsiveness of production and class I consumption to 
price changes. If all the production and consumption 
changes in the market between 1969 and 1975 were 
attributed to CMPC pricing activities, the net effect by 
1975 was to raise the blend price by 7.5 cents per hun­
dredweight, or 0.9 percent, above the federal order level. 
If none of those changes were attributed to CMPC, the 
effect by 1975 was to raise the blend price by 17.5 cents 
per hundredweight, or 2.2 percent. Therefore, produc­
tion and consumption responses possibly brought about 
by CMPC’s pricing policies may by 1975 have reduced 
its effect on blend prices by as much as 10 cents per 
hundredweight, or 57 percent of that year’s premium.
During the years 1969-75, CMPC’s net class I charge 
averaged 26.5 cents per hundredweight, or 3.9 percent 
of the federal order price. Assuming the price elasticity 
of demand was -0.28, this premium could have ac­
counted for slightly more than half of the decrease in 
class I sales during that period, and possibly increased 
service charges may have intensified that effect. Al­
though order pricing methods may have been partly 
responsible, during that period Chicago order handlers’ 
share of class I sales within the marketing area de­
clined from 97.8 percent to 94.4 percent.
Between 1969 and 1975 producer receipts on the 
Chicago order market increased by 24.4 percent and 
class I sales decreased 11.3 percent. The resulting 
buildup of surplus milk evidently was attributable to an 
excessive class I differential and lenient pooling re­
quirements under the federal order as well as to cooper­
ative pricing policies, although all of these reflected 
cooperative bargaining efforts. The growth in supplies 
resulted in an unnecessary attachment to the order of 
outlying manufacturing plants with little commitment 
to the fluid market. Moreover, by 1975, prices paid to 
producers were higher in central Wisconsin than in the 
inner zones of the market. Evaluation of cooperative 
activities in the market should consider these develop­
ments.
f  a ,^ le.se conclusions were drawn as to the effects of 
e erafion activities in the Chicago regional federal 
order market during 1969-75:
1. Bargaining activities increased producer pay 
prices to some extent. But, probably partly as a result of 
me superpoo1 premium charged by CMPC, during the 
P no of the study there was a sharp increase in pro- 
ucer receipts and a substantial decline in class I sales,
both of which reduced the blend price. Moreover, despite 
a high percentage of cooperative membership in the 
market, CMPC competitive credits increased faster 
than the class I charge, and the proportion of the mar­
ket’s class I sales made by regulated handlers declined. 
These developments emphasize the lim its to the 
amount of price enhancement possible through the ex­
ercise of bargaining power in this market.
2. Various federation activities increased barriers to 
entry by alternative supplies of milk. This was a major 
objective of participation in the standby pool. Credits 
and other allowances to processors who competed with 
milk from nonfederation sources were forms of limit 
pricing, which has the same objective. Even though the 
federation controlled most of the regulated supply of 
milk, these protective measures proved to be relatively 
costly.
3. Price enhancement resulting from federation ac­
tivities presumably intensified the buildup of surplus 
milk on the market as additional supply plants 
qualified. This consequence, together with pricing class 
III milk below its competitive value under the order and 
perhaps more generous benefits under federation pric­
ing and service charge policies, favored producers in 
outlying supply areas relative to those in the inner 
zones.
4. Because some federation activities directly bene­
fited fluid milk processors and increased overall effi­
ciency in marketing, the net class I charge was not fully 
reflected in a higher cost of milk to processors. Some 
federation marketing programs slightly reduced the 
cost of milk to processors. Others, such as providing 
supplemental milk and marketing processors surplus 
milk, could be carried out more efficiently by a cen­
tralized agency than by individual fluid milk pro­
cessors. These activities also reduced processors’ risk 
and uncertainty in the procurement of milk and in 
disposal of their surplus, stabilized milk prices and 
market conditions, offered advance pricing, and in other 
ways cultivated a harmonious relationship between 
them and cooperatives, which strengthened producer 
bargaining power.
5. Supply-demand balancing operations in the mar­
ket were made more costly to cooperatives by seasonal 
and daily fluctuations in production and consumption. 
Existence of these fluctuations increased the compara­
tive advantage of a centralized agency in providing 
supplemental milk and in disposing of surplus, thereby 
augmenting the benefits it could provide to fluid milk 
processors and to the market as a whole by performing 
those services.
6. Ta member cooperatives, federation activities pro­
vided assurance of the price benefits resulting from 
participation in the pool, greater bargaining power 
through collective action, savings in transportation 
costs, and more efficient manufacturing by taking ad­
vantage of the unit rule in pooling, compensation for 
certain services in adjusting market supplies to need, 
and other gains. The possibility of obtaining these bene­
fits presumably made collective action in cooperative 
activity easier to attain than it would have been 
otherwise.
7. The bargaining gains achieved by the federation
resulted both from activities that benefited fluid milk 
processors and from activities that imposed added costs 
on them. Activities in the first category included 
providing processors with supplemental milk, dispos­
ing of their surplus milk at an attractive price, advertis­
ing, and the like. While beneficial to processors, some of 
these activities increased their dependence on CMPC. 
On the other hand, the addition of a class I charge and 
perhaps increased service charges, the reduction in 
sources of milk resulting from collective action among 
cooperatives, and activities designed to raise barriers to 
entry for nonfederation milk tended to increase the 
price of milk to processors and consumers. The federa­
tion was in a stronger position to impose these added 
costs upon processors because of the benefits it provided 
them. This power is limited, however, by the coopera­
tives’ lack of control over members’ production and the 
availability of alternative milk supplies.
8. There were indications that the federations were 
interested in, and trying to improve, equity, orderliness, 
stability, and efficiency in the market. There was evi­
dence of this, for example, both in certain allowances to 
handlers and supply plants and in the arrangements 
for distributing to producers those funds remaining in 
the superpool fund after meeting marketing program 
and administrative expenses. The complexity of these 
arrangements reflected the intricate market situation 
in which the federation operated. The question should 
be raised as to whether the market situation was made 
more complicated by the sharp increase in milk sup­
plies from manufacturing plants whose interest in the 
market did not conform to that of the producers who had 
long supplied it.
9. Operations of federations in the Chicago regional 
federal order market necessarily were influenced by 
provisions of the order. For example, standards of per­
formance of supply plants were related to qualification 
requirements. Class I charges were related to the order 
class I price, and milk for class II products was advance 
priced in conformity with expected levels of the order 
class II price. Moreover, some federation actions were 
intended to compensate handlers and producers for de­
ficiencies in the order. This behavior did not necessarily 
absolve cooperatives of responsibility for the effects of 
controversial federal order provisions because coopera­
tives may have sought many of these provisions in 
attempts to increase their bargaining power.
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